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INTRODUCTION 
Pretrial practice in federal civil litigation has dramatically changed 
over the last thirty years.  Pretrial practice, pleading, discovery, Daubert 
motions,1 summary judgment, and settlement have become the focus 
of federal civil litigation while trials have vanished.  Judges have be-
come managers and gatekeepers, while juries have disappeared.  Pub-
lic adjudication in courts has been reduced.  Judicial gatekeeping is 
happening at an earlier stage than ever before.  The recent Supreme 
Court decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 
which have dramatically heightened pleading standards, are already 
turning 12(b)(6)4 motions to dismiss into early summary judgments.5  
Iqbal has been described as the “sleeper case” of the 2008 Term be-
cause of its unexpected impact on every federal civil matter filed in 
the federal courts.6  One commentator noted that “Iqbal is the most 
significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litiga-
tion in the federal courts.”7  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who dis-
sented from the decision, told a group of federal judges at the Second 
Circuit Judicial Conference that the ruling was both important and 
dangerous.8  “In my view,” she said, “the [C]ourt’s majority messed up 
the federal rules” governing civil litigation.9 
 
1 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (holding that 
the trial judge must review proposed expert scientific testimony and assess “whether 
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . . 
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”). 
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
3 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted”). 
5 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Everything today’s majori-
ty says would . . . make perfect sense if it were ruling on a Rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment. . . . But . . . a heightened production burden at the summary judgment 
stage does not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage.”). 
6 Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Ruling Hits Plaintiffs’ Attorneys:  Term’s “Sleeper 
Case” Requires Plaintiffs to List Specific, Detailed Allegations to Reach Discovery, L.A. DAILY J., 
July 28, 2009, at 1 (noting that Iqbal’s “impact is likely to prove far greater than anyone 
envisioned before it was argued”).  
7 Adam Liptak, From Case About 9/11, Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2009, at A10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas C. Goldstein). 
8 See id. (reporting the remarks of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
9 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
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Although some have argued that concerns about the cost of litiga-
tion, especially discovery, are shaping these developments—the major-
ity suggested as much in both Twombly10 and Iqbal11—this is not the 
whole story.  Many factors beyond litigation cost are influencing these 
decisions.  Judicial decisions at every level, including the Supreme 
Court, have expressed a widespread and generalized “hostility to liti-
gation.”12  The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),13 for exam-
ple, was enacted in order to move tort litigation from state to federal 
courts, where defendants believe that they will get a more receptive 
hearing.  As the ideological predilections of federal judges have 
shifted, many federal judges have expressed the view that employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases are often weak and without merit.14 
Whatever the reasons, the greatest impact of this change in the 
landscape of federal pretrial practice is the dismissal of civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases from federal courts in disproportio-
nate numbers.  Fewer civil rights and employment cases are being 
filed in the federal courts.  These issues have become the subject of 
 
10 The majority in Twombly suggests that the cost of litigation, and especially the 
cost of discovery, prompted the Court’s decision, see 550 U.S. at 557-60, while the dis-
sent points out that careful management of discovery and litigation costs can address 
this problem without dismissing at the pleading stage, see id. at 584 n.18 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).   
11 In Iqbal, the majority also repeatedly emphasizes discovery costs.  See, e.g., Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (expressing concern with the “heavy costs” 
imposed on the government by discovery).  
12 See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to Litigation as an Or-
ganizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2006) 
(“In case after case and in wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court has 
expressed a profound hostility to litigation.”). 
13 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see 
also GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 2-4 (2005) (noting that 
a key purpose of CAFA was to prevent tort plaintiffs from blocking removal to federal 
court).  See generally Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s historical context and 
impact). 
14 See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 
LA. L. REV. 555, 557 (2001) (describing the unusual difficulty of proving employment 
discrimination claims, and arguing that this difficulty results largely from judicial bias).  
Although Selmi’s article focuses exclusively on employment discrimination, this Article 
looks at both civil rights and employment discrimination cases.  Some of the data cited 
here cover both sets of cases and some cover only employment discrimination cases.  
In the Administrative Office of the United States Courts’s data, on which many of the 
studies rely, Code 442, “Civil Rights:  Employment,” and Code 440, “Other Civil 
Rights,” are the relevant categories.  See Nature of Suit Codes, http://pacer.psc.usc 
ourts.gov/documents/natsuit.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (listing federal suit 
codes). 
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national attention.15  In this Article, I examine the disparate impact 
that the changing nature of pretrial practice has on civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases.  I argue that this serious effect rais-
es important questions about purportedly “neutral” rules in the feder-
al courts and should make us look closely at the impact of procedural 
revision on civil rights and employment cases.  In addition, it raises 
larger questions about whether the swift termination of these cases in 
federal court is disposing of meritorious cases and forces us to consid-
er the implications of these cases going to state court. 
There is a substantial literature about the heavy burdens that em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs bear in federal court.16  But new de-
velopments in federal pretrial practice that reflect the strengthening 
of “judicial gatekeeping”—such as Twombly, Iqbal, summary judgment, 
and Daubert—appear to be having a considerable impact on employ-
ment discrimination and civil rights cases.  Empirical studies of the ef-
fect of Twombly and Iqbal suggest that these decisions have resulted in 
the disproportionate dismissal of civil rights cases.17  Recent data on 
 
15 See Mary Pat Gallagher, Where Have All the Employment Cases Gone?, NAT’L L.J., 
Oct. 6, 2008, at S19 (discussing the drop in federal employment discrimination filings 
and the possible causes of the drop). 
16 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plain-
tiffs in Federal Court:  From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131-32 (2009) 
[hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse] (analyzing updated data to find 
that employment discrimination plaintiffs are filing fewer cases in federal court per-
haps because they “now recogniz[e] their low chances for success”); Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, Employ-
ment Discrimination Plaintiffs] (finding that employment discrimination plaintiffs are less 
successful than other litigants at the pretrial, trial, and appeal stages in federal court).  
17 See Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly:  A Proposed Pleading Standard for 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (“[A] higher percen-
tage of decisions . . . granted a motion to dismiss in the Title VII context when the 
courts relied on Twombly.”); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?  A 
Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (“The rate of dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked 
in the four months since Twombly.”).  More recently, Patricia Hatamyar has reviewed 
1039 reported and unreported federal district court cases deciding motions to dismiss 
and found that 46% of motions were granted under Conley, 48% of motions were 
granted under Twombly, and 56% of motions were granted under Iqbal.  Patricia W. Ha-
tamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1487764.  Additionally, she found that when courts apply the Twombly/Iqbal pleading 
standard, the odds that courts will grant a motion to dismiss are 1.5 times greater than 
under the Conley standard.  Id.  Hatamyar determined that constitutional civil rights 
cases are the “largest category of cases in which 12(b)(6) motions are filed.”  Id.  She 
concluded that motions to dismiss in constitutional civil rights cases were granted at a 
higher rate (53%) than in cases overall (49%), and the rate of granting 12(b)(6) mo-
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summary judgment in three district courts support this disparate im-
pact.18  And the most recent Federal Judicial Center study of summary 
judgment, prepared in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules’s proposed amendment providing for a summary judgment 
“point-counterpoint” format for movant and respondent, suggests that 
the “prominent role” of summary judgment in civil rights and em-
ployment cases is “striking.”19 
I have recently explored some of these questions in the context of 
summary judgment.20  But it is important to look at these issues more 
broadly in light of the interrelated dimensions of federal pretrial prac-
tice.  There is a widespread view that our federal civil litigation system 
continues to be “transsubstantive,”21 with rules that apply the same way 
to all types of actions.  Each procedural dimension—pleading, discov-
ery, Daubert motions, or summary judgment—is viewed as neutral, dis-
crete, and operating independently of the others.  Yet recent expe-
rience with the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendment to Rule 
56, which would have mandated “point-counterpoint” summary judg-
ment presentation as a presumptively uniform procedure for most 
cases (ultimately rejected by the Committee) suggests the need for 
close scrutiny of the operation of federal pretrial practice on civil 
rights and employment cases on summary judgment.22  Many com-
 
tions in constitutional civil rights cases increased in the cases selected from Conley 
(50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal (60%).  Id. 
18 See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, 
Across Case Categories, and Across Districts:  An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 
17-18 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-022, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373 (finding that “summary judgment rates 
in employment discrimination and other civil rights cases are consistently higher than 
rates in contract and torts cases”).   
19 Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Mi-
chael Baylson, 2-3 (Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Cecil & Cort Memorandum], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf.  In this 
Article, I refer to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules as the “Advisory Committee,” 
the “Civil Rules Committee,” or the “Committee,” and the Standing Committee on 
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure as the “Standing Committee.” 
20 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment:  Gender and Federal 
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 714-15 (2007) (analyzing the effect of sum-
mary judgment in gender cases and its tendency to “permit subtle bias to go un-
checked”).  
21 For a recent discussion of “transsubstantive” procedure, see Jenny S. Martinez, 
Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2008), 
which examines the relationship between substance and procedure and the limits of 
“transsubstantive” procedure in “war on terror” cases.  
22 Comments submitted concerning the proposed “point-counterpoint” amend-
ment to Rule 56(c) are available on the Rules comment website.  Admin. Office of the 
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mentators raised questions as to whether this purportedly purely “pro-
cedural” reform of the Rule would lead to increased grants of sum-
mary judgment and dismissals in civil rights and employment cases.23  
An amended Rule 56 became effective December 1, 2009.24 
In this Article, I analyze three discrete aspects of the shift in pre-
trial practice—pleading, summary judgment, and Daubert—in depth 
and then assess their cumulative impact on civil rights and employ-
ment cases.  My concern with this issue stems from my experience as a 
civil rights litigator at a time when federal courts were viewed as the 
bulwark of civil rights protection.  I am sensitive to the historical di-
alectic between federal/state parity and civil rights preferences that 
affect whether federal or state courts are the best venues for the reso-
lution of civil rights matters.25  Now, however, cases involving matters 
of public importance are relegated to state courts, where judges are 
subject to greater political pressure.  Lawyers and judges now perceive 
that state courts have become the forum for plaintiffs, while federal 
courts are the forum for defendants.26 
 
U.S. Courts, 2008 Civil Rules Comment Chart, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
2008_Civil_Rules_Comments_Chart.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).  Indeed, many 
witnesses who testified at the Advisory Committee’s three public hearings, and many 
comments that were submitted, focused on the potential deleterious impact of these 
proposals on civil rights and employment cases as well.  See infra Part II (discussing 
“point-counterpoint”). 
23 Several participants at the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’s Mini-Conference 
on Rule 56 in November 2007 had raised this issue.  See Letter from Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, Brooklyn Law Sch., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Nov. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008%20Comments%20Committee%20Folders/CV%
20Comments%202008/08-CV-049-Testimony-Schneider.pdf (noting that several partic-
ipants at the conference expressed concern about the way the proposed rule would 
operate and that academics and judges have underscored the dangers of summary 
judgment with respect to civil rights and employment cases). 
24 See Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (May 8, 2009, revised June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Kravitz 
Memorandum], in COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE 
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE app. at C-1 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ 
Combined_ST_Report_Sept_2009.pdf. 
25 Compare Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1977) 
(arguing that federal courts are “institutionally preferable” to state courts “as forums in 
which to raise federal constitutional claims”), with William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of 
Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599-600 (1999) (noting that gay litigants have 
had greater success in state courts, which suggests that state courts might sometimes 
have institutional advantages for disfavored clients). 
26 See Gallagher, supra note 15 (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to 
keep their cases in state courts because of the higher success rate there); Hurley, supra 
8 SCHNEIDER FINAL PRINT REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:30 PM 
2010] The Impact of Pretrial Practice on Discrimination Cases 523 
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of changes in federal 
pretrial practice and a review of recent data on civil rights and em-
ployment cases in the federal courts.  It then turns to the procedural 
aspects of pleading and the history of special pleading burdens in civil 
rights cases, which were rejected by the Supreme Court, and the im-
pact of Twombly and Iqbal.  This part then proceeds to discuss the pro-
cedural aspects of summary judgment, summary judgment decision-
making in general and in civil rights and employment cases in 
particular, the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on summary judgment, 
and the problematic approach to summary judgment reflected in Scott 
v. Harris.27  Part I concludes with a brief look at the procedural aspects 
of Daubert motions, the way they are tied to summary judgment, and 
their effect on civil rights and employment discrimination cases.  Part 
II examines the broader implications of these developments for fed-
eral pretrial practice, and focuses on the need for a close analysis of 
the impact of “neutral” Rules, such as the proposed but rejected 
“point-counterpoint” amendment to Rule 56, on employment discrim-
ination and civil rights litigation.  Part III explores why these changes 
are occurring and considers what it would take to reverse this trend. 
I.  THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRETRIAL PRACTICE IN  
THE FEDERAL COURTS 
From our current vantage point, there have been tremendous 
changes in federal pretrial practice over the last thirty years.  These 
changes include the development of heightened pleading standards, 
the increased use of summary judgment, the development of Daubert 
hearings, more settlements, the greater use of managerial judging, 
and the disappearance of civil trials.  Although each of these devel-
opments involve different sources of law and may be occurring for ar-
guably different reasons, they are all interrelated.  Some of these 
changes—such as increased settlement and the disappearance of civil 
trials—may be cumulative, the results of interaction among other de-
velopments. 
This notion of interrelationship among parts is fundamental to 
the operation of procedure under the Federal Rules.  The idea of 
simple notice pleading was integrally related to (and indeed interde-
pendent with) provisions for extensive discovery and summary judg-
 
note 6 (“Thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court[’s Iqbal decision], plaintiffs’ attorneys now 
have to think twice before filing civil lawsuits in federal court.”).  
27 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
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ment.  The majorities’ rationales for heightening the burden of plead-
ing in Twombly and Iqbal were to reduce the expense and duration of 
discovery.  Change in one aspect of the rules and the litigation process 
inevitably impacts every other aspect of the process, although we do 
not always know how.  Yet we need to look at these changes in a sys-
temic way.  Stephen Yeazell has made this point: 
 Although we consciously chose the individual legal changes, we have 
not entirely comprehended their combined effect.  As a consequence, 
we sometimes debate particular features—for example, styles of judging, 
the virtues and vices of discovery, abuses of the legal system, alternatives 
to litigation, and various docket-speeding local experiments—without 
acknowledging their links to the system as a whole.  We need a better 
sense of these connections and a more comprehensive sense of how 
process functions as a system.
28
 
 Historically, federal courts were the place for civil rights relief.  
Our vision of the federal courts over the last half century has been 
shaped by the civil rights movement.  Civil rights and employment 
discrimination cases often raise issues of social importance and re-
quire a public forum.  Public exposure of these cases legitimates sto-
ries of harm.  The erasure of these cases from federal court makes the 
cases and their histories invisible.  Yet the impact of these various de-
velopments has been to dismiss these cases and take them out of fed-
eral court. 
Between 1988 and 2003, the number of employment discrimina-
tion cases in federal court “rose in absolute numbers and as a propor-
tion of all civil litigation.”29  But today, it is widely recognized that em-
ployment discrimination and civil rights cases face enormous hurdles 
in federal court.  There is a considerable literature on this issue that 
looks at all phases of the litigation process.30  In virtually every phase 
 
28 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 631, 632. 
29 Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertain Justice:  Liti-
gating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 13 (Am. Bar 
Found. Research Paper Series No. 08-04, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1093313.  The authors describe 1988–2003 as a high point of employment 
civil rights enforcement because “protections against employment discrimination were 
extended to older workers, the disabled, and those in need of family and medical 
leave”; sexual harassment was recognized as a violation of Title VII in 1986; the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the right to damages and to jury trial; and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act was passed in 1992.  Id.  
30 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16 (describing data 
on employment discrimination plaintiffs’ lack of success in federal trial and appellate 
courts); Selmi, supra note 14, at 559-60 (providing data on civil rights and employment 
plaintiffs’ low success rates in federal court). 
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of the process, now ranging from pleading to appeals, there appears 
to be a disparate impact on employment discrimination and civil 
rights cases. 
In their pioneering 2004 study on employment discrimination 
cases in federal court, Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab rely on da-
ta from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts beginning in 
1970.31  They conclude that 
[e]mployment discrimination plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe.  They 
manage many fewer happy resolutions early in litigation, and so they 
have to proceed toward trial more often.  They win a lower proportion of 
cases during pretrial and at trial.  Then, more of their successful cases 
are appealed.  On appeal, they have a harder time upholding their suc-
cesses and reversing adverse outcomes.
32
 
Clermont and Schwab have recently updated this study, looking at five 
more years of current data from the same source.33  In this new article, 
they argue that matters have changed for the worse for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs.34  They report a “startling drop” in the num-
ber of employment discrimination cases in federal court:  the category 
of employment discrimination cases “has dropped in absolute number 
of terminations every year after fiscal year 1999, and it has dropped as 
a percentage of the docket every year after fiscal year 2001.”35  In 1997, 
employment discrimination was the largest single category of civil liti-
gation cases in federal court.36  By 2006, employment discrimination 
cases accounted for less than 6% of the federal civil docket (from 10% 
five years before) and were no longer the largest category of cases.37  
Clermont and Schwab conclude that judicial bias at all levels of the lit-
igation process may be discouraging litigants and lawyers from pur-
suing these cases in the federal courts.38 
 
31 Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 16 (discuss-
ing the special difficulties employment discrimination plaintiffs face because of judi-
cial bias). 
32 Id. at 429. 
33 Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 103. 
34 Id. at 131 (“Maybe the situation has not gone from bad to worse in the last five 
years.  But those plaintiffs may have gone from merely faring badly to feeling bad 
about their chances for success, which would affect their litigation behavior.”). 
35 Id. at 104. 
36 Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 437 fig.4. 
37 Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 117. 
38 Id. at 104-05 (“The fear of judicial bias at both the lower and appellate court 
levels may be discouraging potential employment discrimination plaintiffs from seek-
ing relief in the federal courts.”). 
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Their statistics are indeed startling.  Between 1979 and 2006, the 
plaintiff win rate in federal court for “jobs cases” (15%) was dramati-
cally lower than for “nonjobs cases” (51%).39  During that same time 
period, employment discrimination plaintiffs won only 3.59% of pre-
trial adjudications, while other plaintiffs won 21.05% of pretrial adju-
dications.40  On appeal, there was a 41% reversal rate of plaintiff wins 
in job cases at the district court level but only a 9% reversal rate of de-
fendant wins in those cases at the district court level.41  Although 
Clermont and Schwab emphasize that this phenomenon shapes pre-
trial dispositions, settlement, trial, and appeals, this Article focuses on 
the formal aspects of pretrial practice. 
Settlement is another locus of disparate impact.  Settlement is al-
ways lurking in the background of pretrial practice and often results 
after a ruling on summary judgment.  A recent study on settlement in 
federal trial courts by Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers 
suggests that employment discrimination cases settle less frequently 
than other kinds of cases and that at least part of the reason for such 
“poorer performance” is in-court treatment.42  They observe that 
[t]he pattern of employment case outcomes persists from the pretrial 
stage through the appellate stage.  Employment cases have fewer early 
terminations than other cases, a much lower plaintiff win rate on pretrial 
motions than other cases, a much lower plaintiff win rate at trial than 
other cases, a much lower win rate in judge trials than in jury trials of 
employment cases, a higher trial rate than other cases, a strong anti-
plaintiff effect on appeal, and a diving number of filings.
43
 
I turn now to the major aspects of pretrial litigation:  pleading, 
summary judgment, and Daubert. 
 
39 Id. at 127.  
40 Id. at 128. 
41 Id. at 110 display 2. 
42 Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 145 (2009).   
43 Id.  A recent study of settlement rates drawing on data from federal cases in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia suggests that set-
tlement rates in employment discrimination cases are among the lowest of those case 
categories studied.  See id. at 135 (noting that the settlement rate of employment dis-
crimination cases in the two districts from 2001–2002 was “relatively low” compared to 
other case categories, including tort and contract); see also Vivian Berger, Michael O. 
Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment 
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 50-67 (2005) (studying sum-
mary judgment motion dispositions in district courts of the Second Circuit in order to 
identify the factors that parties to an employment discrimination case should consider 
when estimating a case’s expected settlement value). 
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A.  Pleading 
The traditional view is that the Federal Rules established notice 
pleading.  Rule 8 provides for “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”44  In Conley v. Gib-
son, the Court stated that a complaint should not be dismissed unless 
the plaintiff “can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.”45  For fifty years, Conley meant that Rule 
12(b)(6) motions were disfavored.  The only type of claim for which the 
Federal Rules required a higher burden of pleading was Rule 9(b) fraud.  
Otherwise, notice pleading was the rule as a transsubstantive matter. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, some district court judges 
began to challenge the assumption of notice pleading in civil rights 
cases because of their own views of these cases.  They wrote decisions 
requiring a higher burden of pleading in civil rights cases, dismissing 
the cases on 12(b)(6) grounds.46  But in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the 
Supreme Court rejected this effort.47  One reason for the Court’s re-
jection was that district courts had sought to carve out this higher 
burden of pleading in civil rights cases on their own through case law, 
even though the Rules were intended to be transsubstantive. 
In Twombly, a 2007 antitrust case, the Court wrote an opinion that 
started a revolution in pleading and the federal civil litigation system.48  
In rejecting the longstanding rule of Conley v. Gibson, the Court ruled 
that pleading allegations had to be “plausible” and emphasized the 
importance of judicial gatekeeping where heavy litigation costs were a 
threat.49  The standard of Conley v. Gibson, the Court ruled, “ha[d] 
 
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
45 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
46 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993) (reversing the district court’s application of a “heigh-
tened pleading standard” to a § 1983 claim).  See generally Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed 
Frivolous:  Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 935, 939 (1990) (examining courts’ increasing demand that civil rights 
complaints meet a stricter pleading standard). 
47 See 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without 
regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.”). 
48 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 
95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2010) (manuscript at 12-13), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1448796 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal establish an invented test 
for pleading that is novel, unpredictable, and disruptive and that generally destabilizes 
the federal civil litigation system). 
49 550 U.S. at 559.  
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earned its retirement.”50  Since Twombly, judges, lawyers, and legal 
scholars have debated the meaning of the Court’s holding.51  The case 
has been widely cited, and there has been considerable scholarly dis-
cussion of the implications of the decision.52  Discussion initially fo-
cused on whether the Supreme Court intended the case to reach 
pleading generally or whether it was limited to antitrust cases.53  The 
2009 Iqbal decision makes clear that Twombly set out a general plead-
ing standard and is not limited to antitrust cases. 
Iqbal, a five-to-four decision, fully overturns Conley v. Gibson.54  Iqbal 
was a Bivens civil rights claim alleging discriminatory detention and 
treatment of a man of Pakistani descent after 9/11.55  The decision is 
very broad, rejects the concept of notice pleading, and requires the 
district court to determine whether there is a “plausible” claim based 
on the facts alleged in the complaint and the substantive law.  Iqbal 
 
50 Id. at 563. 
51 For example, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam), de-
cided after Twombly, seems to suggest a more liberal pleading standard when the plain-
tiff is a pro se litigant. 
52 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:  How Motions to Dismiss Be-
come (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 81-99 (2007) (arguing 
that the Twombly standard should not govern cases in which public facts do not negate 
the thrust of a complaint but should apply when the “defendant has negated all infe-
rences of culpability”); Seiner, supra note 17, at 1015, 1026-53 (arguing that “courts 
should exercise great caution before applying Twombly too rigidly” in employment dis-
crimination cases and proposing a uniform framework by which to evaluate the suffi-
ciency of Title VII complaints); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 431, 431 (2008) (criticizing Twombly as a decision that allows “the interests of pro-
tecting defendants against expensive discovery and managing burdensome case- 
loads . . . to prevail over the interests of access and resolution on the merits”); Suja A. 
Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1878 
(2008) (arguing that the decision in Twombly violates the Seventh Amendment’s guar-
antee of a citizen’s right to a jury trial); Hannon, supra note 17, at 1835-46 (providing 
an empirical study of Twombly’s effect on the role of dismissals in district court cases 
and concluding that its immediate impact has been on civil rights cases). 
53 See e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/ 
07/09/dodson.pdf (arguing that the “plausibility” standard is absolute and not re-
stricted to antitrust cases); Spencer, supra note 52, at 457 (stating affirmatively that 
“Twombly is not merely an antitrust case”); Thomas, supra note 52, at 1888 (stating that 
the Twombly ruling affects more than just antitrust cases); Mary J. Hackett & Patricia E. 
Antezana, All but Two Circuits Interpret ‘ Twombly’ Broadly, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 27, 2008, at 
S3 (“Federal circuit courts of appeals across the country have, for the most part, em-
braced the new Twombly standard in all types of cases.”). 
54 See Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly 
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and 
discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)).  
55 Id. at 1943. 
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now requires plaintiffs to come forward with concrete facts at the out-
set of a lawsuit and instructs district judges to dismiss lawsuits that rest 
on implausible legal claims. 
It is important to look closely at the language of Iqbal to discern 
what the Court now requires from pleading.  In his majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy writes: 
 As the Court held in Twombly, the pleading standard Rule 8 an-
nounces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands 
more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusa-
tion.  A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic re-
citation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Nor does a 
complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further 
factual enhancement.” 
 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.”  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads fac-
tual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  The plausibility stan-
dard is not akin to a “probability requirement” but it asks for more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.  Where a com-
plaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liabili-
ty, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘en-
titlement to relief.’” 
 Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly.  First, the 
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.  Threadbare recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory state-
ments, do not suffice. . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous depar-
ture from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it 
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing 
more than conclusions.  Second, only a complaint that states a plausible 
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.  Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals 
observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . 
 In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dis-
miss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are 
no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations.  When there are well-pleaded 
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then deter-
mine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
56
 
 
56 Id. at 1949-50 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Kennedy’s characterization of what a district court should 
do stands in sharp contrast to Justice Souter’s account in his Iqbal dis-
sent.  Justice Souter authored the majority opinion in Twombly.  In 
analyzing the complaint in Iqbal, Souter criticizes defendants Ashcroft 
and Mueller’s claim that Iqbal’s allegations were “implausible” be-
cause such high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved 
in the specific actions of lower-level officers down the bureaucratic 
chain of command.”57  He goes on to spell out the following: 
[T]his response bespeaks a fundamental misunderstanding of the en-
quiry that Twombly demands.  Twombly does not require a court at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are 
probably true.  We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the al-
legations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.  The sole exception to 
this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we 
know it:  claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or ex-
periences in time travel.  That is not what we have here.
58
 
Thus, Justice Souter’s view of the district court’s task in reviewing fac-
tual allegations in the complaint dramatically differs from the majori-
ty.59  It is significant that Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes that 
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for re-
lief . . . requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.”60  Presumably, the Court intended to emphasize 
that the district court should explicitly apply these factors to the as-
sessment of whether the plaintiff’s pleading is plausible.  But reliance 
on “judicial experience” and “common sense” necessarily adds a more 
subjective element to a district court’s assessment of whether a plain-
tiff’s claim should go forward.  As Stephen Burbank has observed, this 
aspect of the Iqbal decision “obviously licenses highly subjective judg-
ments. . . . This is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases 
they disfavor.”61  Further, the new heightened pleading standard 
seems to render summary judgment irrelevant because district judges 
 
57 Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
58 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
59 The murky distinction between factual and legal allegations in the 12(b)(6) 
context haunts this decision.  Justice Kennedy writes, “Although for purposes of a mo-
tion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 
are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Id. 
at 1949-50 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. at 1950. 
61 Liptak, supra note 7, at A10 (quoting Stephen Burbank). 
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can now simply dismiss cases on Rule 12(b)(6) motions and not wait 
for summary judgment.62 
What is breathtaking is that the Court made these changes on its 
own in light of Conley and Rule 8.  Rule 8 was not amended; Congress 
did not pass a statute changing pleading standards.  The Court 
changed federal pleading standards for all cases, despite prior deci-
sions such as Swierkiewicz, in which the Court explicitly rejected the no-
tion that pleading requirements in civil rights and employment cases 
should change.63  The Court also ignored the rulemaking process that 
is in place for procedural reform of federal civil litigation.64  Indeed, 
scholars and practitioners have been so outraged by Iqbal that Senator 
Arlen Specter has now submitted a bill, the Notice Pleading Restora-
tion Act of 2009, which would reverse Iqbal and Twombly and reinstate 
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard as the prevailing pleading standard.65  
Scholars have proposed alternative language for bills that might ac-
complish the same result.66  A hearing in the House of Representa-
tives, entitled Access to Justice Denied:  Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, was 
held by the Judiciary Committee in October 2009.  Professor Arthur 
Miller and representatives of civil rights organizations testified con-
cerning the devastating impact of Iqbal on access to the federal courts, 
 
62 See Michael C. Dorf, Should Congress Change the Standard for Dismissing a Federal 
Lawsuit?, FINDLAW, July 29, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090729.html.  
See generally Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion:  The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly (Oct. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494683. 
63 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (rejecting heightened 
pleading standards).   
64 Id.  Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 48 (manuscript at 32-33) (discussing Twombly 
and Iqbal’s potentially disruptive effect on the process for procedural reform that has 
developed since the promulgation of the Rules in 1938).  In Jones v. Bock, Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote, just a few months before Twombly was decided, that “adopting different 
and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be 
done through established rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by 
the courts.”  549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007). 
65 Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (as intro-
duced in the Senate by Senator Specter, July 22, 2009).  S. 1504 would “provide that 
Federal courts shall not dismiss complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Conley v. Gibson.”  Id. (italics added); see also Tony Mauro, Groups 
Unite to Keep Cases on the Docket:  Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Seek to Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Deci-
sion, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (detailing efforts taken by plaintiff’s lawyers to 
overturn the Iqbal and Twombly decisions). 
66 Dorf, supra note 62 (analyzing the difficulties of amending Twombly via legislation). 
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and on employment discrimination cases and civil rights cases in  
particular.67   
After Twombly, several empirical studies of district court judicial in-
terpretation of the case suggested that it had led to dismissals of civil 
rights and employment cases.68  The first study examined cases on 
Westlaw that were brought under Title VII and district court decisions 
on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim in the year after 
Twombly and compared the numbers with cases prior to Twombly.69  
The author concluded that Twombly “has already made the pleading 
requirements more difficult (and certainly more confusing) for Title 
VII litigants” and that the district courts are aggressively using the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision to “rais[e] the bar as to what an em-
ployment discrimination plaintiff must plead” to survive dismissal of 
employment discrimination claims.70  The second study, conducted by 
a law student, examined all cases found through Westlaw searches that 
cited Twombly from June 2007 to December 2007, the first seven 
months after the decision.71  From the 3287 district court cases sam-
pled, a civil rights action citing Twombly was 39.6% more likely to be 
dismissed than a random case selected from the set.72 
These preliminary findings raised significant questions.  First, dis-
trict judges applying Twombly did not appear to limit the decision to, 
or, indeed, even apply it to, the very factual context in which it 
arose—antitrust claims.73  Second, judges appeared to be interpreting 
 
67 Access to Justice Denied:  Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  The Hearing was chaired by Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY).  The wit-
nesses included:  Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York University School of Law; Gre-
gory Katsas, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department 
of Justice; John Vail, Senior Litigation Counsel and Vice President, Center for Consti-
tutional Litigation; and Debo P. Adegbile, Associate Director of Litigation, NAACP Le-
gal Defense and Educational Fund. 
68  Seiner, supra note 17, at 1026-31 (discussing the higher rate of employment 
discrimination dismissals in cases relying on Twombly); Hannon, supra note 17, at 1837 
(noting the pronounced increase in dismissals of civil rights complaints post-Twombly). 
69 See Seiner, supra note 17, at 1027-29 (describing in full the methodology used to 
perform the study of Twombly’s effect on motions to dismiss). 
70 Id. at 1037-38. 
71 For a discussion of the methodology utilized in the study, see Hannon, supra 
note 17 at 1828-35. 
72 See id. at 1838. 
73 See id. at 1814-15 (stating that an empirical study of Twombly’s effect demon-
strates its application to “every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8”); Seiner, 
supra note 17, at 1013 (“Though Twombly arose in the context of an antitrust case, its 
holding has already been extended by the lower courts to other areas of the law.”). 
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the decision vigorously and disproportionately to dismiss civil rights 
and employment discrimination cases.  Indeed, Iqbal itself is a civil 
rights case in which the pleading issue relates to government immuni-
ty.74  These statistics also raise doubts about the rationale the majority 
gives in Twombly for imposing a higher burden of pleading in civil 
rights cases—the cost of discovery.  Since most civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination cases in the federal courts are individual cas-
es and not cases that involve group litigation or class actions, it seems 
unlikely that concern over the cost of discovery is animating these 
judicial decisions. 
Since Iqbal, there have been many district court (and even some 
circuit court) decisions but only limited empirical data.75  A review of 
the many district and circuit court decisions that have already inter-
preted Iqbal is astonishing.  Twombly and Iqbal have transformed the 
analytic work the district judge has to do at the pleading stage.  Rule 
12(b)(6) decisionmaking is now extraordinarily complex, fact- and 
law-intensive, and lengthy.  District courts are now forced to write de-
tailed analyses of both the plaintiff’s factual claims and of the legal 
sufficiency of those claims.  Plaintiffs are required to produce a consi-
derable degree of factual detail at the very beginning of the lawsuit 
before they have been able to conduct any discovery.  Further, judges 
have to parse the factual and legal claims and analyze the merits of 
these legal claims at the nascent stages of the lawsuit.  Moreover, de-
spite Swierkiewicz,76 the emerging picture suggests that, like Twombly, 
Iqbal has strengthened district court discretion to dismiss civil rights 
and employment cases.  I turn to some of these cases in order to illu-
strate the problems faced by district court judges under Iqbal. 
In many cases, defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions have been granted.  
For example, in Williams v. City of Cleveland the district court dismissed 
a § 1983 claim against the City of Cleveland for false arrest and prose-
cution.77  In dismissing the claim, the district judge held that the 
 
74 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (discussing the plausibility 
standard that complaints must meet to survive a 12(b)(6) motion in the context of a 
detainee’s civil rights action against high-ranking governmental officials). 
75 As of September 21, 2009, a Westlaw search produced 1500 district court and 
100 appellate court opinions.  Mauro, supra note 65, at 31 (showing that “Iqbal mo-
tions” to dismiss have already become commonplace in federal courts); see also Hata-
myar, supra note 17. 
76 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (ruling that there was 
not a higher standard of pleading in employment discrimination cases). 
77 No. 1:09-1310, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61346, at *11 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2009). 
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[p]laintiff must allege facts, which if true, demonstrate the City’s policy, 
such as examples of past situations where law enforcement officials have 
been instructed to ignore evidence. . . . [Plaintiff] has not alleged facts 
from which it can be inferred that this conduct is recurring or that what 
happened in his case was due to City policy.
78
 
However, without discovery, complaints like these can easily be dis-
missed.  The court granted the motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s mo-
tion for leave to amend, citing the complaint’s conclusory manner 
and lack of specific factual allegations.79 
In Jones v. Town of Milo, the plaintiff sued when she lost her job as 
Milo Town Manager after seventeen years of service.80  The plaintiff 
alleged that while working for the defendant, she had never received 
an evaluation rating her performance as less than “excellent” until her 
final year.81  Magistrate Judge Kravchuk recommended dismissal of the 
complaint based on Iqbal, stating that courts may not “indulge an infe-
rence exposing the defendant to liability . . . when the factual allega-
tions support a more likely inferential finding that is incompatible 
with liability.”82  The magistrate judge determined that the plaintiff 
failed to allege facts necessary to state a disqualifying claim for a due 
process violation.83  Similarly, in Snavely v. Arnold, the plaintiff, a for-
mer police officer, brought a § 1983 claim against city officials for vi-
olating his First Amendment rights.84  The court dismissed the com-
plaint, noting that the plaintiff had failed to include specific words or 
conduct that would constitute protected free speech.85 
In Rivera v. Prince William County School Board, a plaintiff brought a 
Title VII hostile work environment claim.86  The plaintiff alleged that 
her co-worker made comments about her sexual relationship with her 
husband, offered to buy the plaintiff lingerie for Christmas, and asked 
whether she would wear lingerie for her husband or for him.87  She 
also alleged that he would use sexual innuendo to refer to male geni-
talia, that she received e-mail making sexual references, and that her 
 
78 Id. at *12. 
79 Id. 
80 No. 09-80, 2009 WL 1605409, at *1 (D. Me. June 5, 2009). 
81 Id. at *2-3. 
82 Id. at *5.  
83 Id. at *6-8. 
84 No. 1:08-12165, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51415, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2009). 
85 Id. at *5. 
86 No 1:09-341, 2009 WL 2232746, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 22, 2009). 
87 Id. at *2. 
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co-worker smacked her behind.88  In reviewing the defendant’s 
12(b)(6) motion, the district court noted that complaints relying on 
“naked assertions devoid of further enhancement” are insufficient89 
and that the claims presented must allow the court to draw the rea-
sonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct al-
leged.90  The court “sliced and diced” the plaintiff’s allegations, saying 
that the harassment had only spanned seventeen months and involved 
only four instances of sexual harassment, clearly minimizing the harm 
that the plaintiff claimed. 
Several district court opinions have, in employment discrimina-
tion cases, considered Swierkiewicz and puzzled over the particular im-
pact of Iqbal on Swierkiewicz.91  District courts have repeatedly cited the 
language of Iqbal, and several circuits have already disagreed on this 
issue.  District courts have suggested that “threadbare recitals of the 
elements of the cause of action” do not suffice to state a claim, often 
finding complaints “conclusory.”92 
There are also numerous employment and civil rights cases in 
which district courts have granted leave to amend.  The process of 
amending complaints could go on for a long time and be very time-
consuming and expensive.  Iqbal has opened the door to minute and 
searching judicial analysis of each factual and legal allegation in the 
complaint. 
Despite approval of Iqbal in many lower courts, some judges have 
expressed hostility to the decision.  In a transcript on a 12(b)(6) mo-
tion in Madison v. City of Chicago,93 Judge Milton Shadur chided the de-
fendant for treating the Twombly and Iqbal standard as a “universal ‘get 
out of jail free’ card.”94  Judge Shadur expressed special concern with 
the way Twombly and Iqbal will be interpreted in employment discrimi-
nation cases.  He suggested that the Supreme Court had adopted a 
 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). 
90 Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). 
91 See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, No. 07-4285, 2009 WL 2501662 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 18, 2009); Kabil v. Youngblood, No. 1:08-00281, 2009 WL 2475006 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 
11, 2009); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-245, 2009 WL 
2424608 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009); Oshop v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 3:09-
0063, 2009 WL 1651479 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 2009). 
92 Oshop, 2009 WL 1651479, at *6. 
93 Transcript of Proceedings at 2, Madison v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3629 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 10, 2009). 
94 Id. at 2. 
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“fact-pleading regime rather than the notice-pleading regime that the 
federal courts operate under.”95  Judge Shadur was unwilling to grant 
the motion and ordered the parties to begin discovery with the re-
quired advance disclosures.96  He admonished defense counsel regard-
ing Iqbal: 
Well, you know defense counsel—how will I characterize it?  You ask if 
it’s new.  It’s Pavlovian.  You know, the bell has rung and defense coun-
sel salivates.  They say, “Wow!  Here is our chance to dump a lot of cas-
es.” . . . But you see employment discrimination cases have a long history 
of confirmation by our Court of Appeals and others that say that all you 
have to [do] is to say, “I was discriminated on based on my sex” and 
identify the . . . adverse employment action.  In that case, that’s what dis-
covery is really for.
97
 
Other judges have also resisted Iqbal.  In Chao v. Ballista, the plain-
tiff brought a claim against the supervisors of a prison for failure to 
investigate and prevent sexual abuse under § 1983.98  She alleged that 
while she was an inmate, she had between 50 and 100 sexual encoun-
ters with one of the defendants and that the same defendant had a 
sexual relationship with another female inmate.99  The defendants ar-
gued that the plaintiff failed to allege “the personal involvement of 
supervisory officials.”100  Judge Nancy Gertner determined that the 
plaintiff’s allegations were plausible enough for the court to infer that 
the sexual abuse could have been prevented had better policies and 
procedures been implemented.101 
Twombly and Iqbal have effectively commanded district judges to 
assess pleadings and the credibility of plaintiffs’ allegations as though 
they were summary judgment motions.  As we see in the next Section, 
summary judgment decisionmaking has been problematic and con-
troversial.  For a district judge to be called on to make a similar as-
sessment on pleading, based on “judicial experience” and “common 
sense” and before discovery, is absurd. 
 
95 Id. at 3. 
96 Id. at 10. 
97 Id. at 11-12.  
98 630 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Mass. 2009). 
99 Id. at 177-78. 
100 Id. at 173-74. 
101 Id. at 174. 
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B.  Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Scott 
There has been considerable change over the years in summary 
judgment practice before the federal courts.102  Rule 56 provides that 
summary judgment can only be granted if there is “no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”103  Historically, summary judgment was disfavored and 
was not to be granted liberally because of the preference for jury trial.  
Cases that presented issues of credibility and weight of evidence were 
deemed inappropriate for summary judgment. 
However, the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions in 1986—
Matsushita,104 Liberty Lobby,105 and Celotex106—provided impetus and en-
couragement to district courts to grant summary judgment more fre-
quently.107  Federal trial judges are now more likely to grant summary 
judgment,108 thereby depriving litigants of the opportunity to have 
 
102 The discussions of summary judgment in this Section and of Daubert in the next 
Section draw heavily on my article, The Dangers of Summary Judgment.  Schneider, supra 
note 20.  See generally Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 
(1998) (tracing the historical development of Rule 56). 
103 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
104 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) 
(holding that a party opposing summary judgment cannot succeed merely by casting 
“metaphysical doubt” about material facts and that policy implications and factual con-
text can increase the nonmovant’s burden). 
105 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding that, in 
motive cases, as in others, the party opposing summary judgment must provide affir-
mative evidence to defeat a Rule 56 motion). 
106 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that a movant 
need only show that the party opposing summary judgment lacks sufficient evidence  
to prevail). 
107 Some scholars argue that the trilogy merely reflected changes that were already 
taking place with respect to summary judgment practice and that the cases did not 
cause those changes.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in 
Federal Civil Cases:  Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
591, 620 (2004) (asserting that the rise in case termination often attributed to the 1986 
case trilogy began during the 1970s).  One empirical study of federal court summary 
judgment practice over the last twenty-five years “call[s] into question the interpreta-
tion that the trilogy led to expansive increases in summary judgment.”  Joe S. Cecil et 
al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIR-
ICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 862 (2007).  There is, however, no dispute that the trilogy has 
encouraged district judges to view summary judgment as an appropriate and important 
vehicle to dispose of cases.  For a full discussion of the history of summary judgment, 
see Burbank, supra, at 594-603, and Wald, supra note 102, at 1898-1917. 
108 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commit-
ments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1133 (2003) (arguing that courts value efficiency over 
litigants’ rights to jury trials).  Judge Patricia Wald has also noted this phenomenon: 
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their claims resolved on a full factual record before a jury (and the 
chance to have the merits of their claims determined by a more di-
verse group of decisionmakers).  For this reason, the federal “sum-
mary judgment industry”109 has been the subject of much recent scho-
larly attention.110  Increasing concern with the “vanishing trial” in 
federal civil cases111 makes summary judgment a particularly important 
 
My review of the D.C. Circuit’s summary judgment rulings over a six-month 
period suggests that judges will stretch to make summary judgment apply even 
in borderline cases which, a decade ago, might have been thought indisputa-
bly trial-worthy.  It also suggests that appellate courts will, by and large, uphold 
these dispositions, unless they think the trial judge got the law wrong. 
Wald, supra note 102, at 1942. 
109 See Milton I. Shadur, From the Bench:  Trial or Tribulations (Rule 56 Style)?, LITIG., 
Winter 2003, at 5, 5 (2003) (“[T]he growth of the summary judgment industry [is] a 
replacement for the civil trial.”). 
110 See Miller, supra note 108, at 984-85 (arguing that current summary judgment 
practices threaten the right to a jury trial); Wald, supra note 102, at 1898 (examining 
the changes to summary judgment over its six-decade history); see also John Bronsteen, 
Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522-27 (2007) (arguing that 
summary judgment costs more than it saves); Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, 
Summary Judgment, and Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 112-20 (2005) 
(analyzing the impact of summary judgment timing on patent litigation); Burbank, 
supra note 107, at 591-92 (exploring summary judgment from “historical, empirical, 
and normative perspectives”); Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discre-
tion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 
91-95 (2002) (debating whether judges may or should be able to deny summary judg-
ment even when it is technically appropriate); Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, In Summary 
It Makes Sense:  A Proposal to Substantially Expand the Role of Summary Judgment in Nonjury 
Cases, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2006) (explaining how the typical concerns 
regarding summary judgment are not present in a bench trial); Martin H. Redish, 
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:  Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2005) (suggesting an expansion of courts’ ability to “reach the me-
rits of summary judgment” and a “more tempered approach to the actual summary 
judgment decision”); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex:  Reconsidering 
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 82-
86 (2006) (reexamining Celotex to align it with prior cases, the text of Rule 56, and its 
own conflicting rationales); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 
93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140-45 (2007) (claiming that summary judgment, as currently used, 
violates the Seventh Amendment). 
111 In December 2003, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Litigation 
convened a meeting of federal and state judges, law professors, and lawyers to discuss 
the “vanishing trial” in both civil and criminal cases.  See Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multip-
ly, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at 1 (examining the 
decreasing proportion of trials and discussing several viewpoints on the decrease); see 
also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (tracing the de-
cline in the proportion and number of cases terminated by trial); John Lande, Intro-
duction to Vanishing Trial Symposium, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 (explaining the causes of 
changing trial patterns, speculating about the effect of such changes, and recommend-
ing improvements); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About 
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subject of inquiry.  Because of the current importance of summary 
judgment in federal civil litigation, the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules has just spent several years revising Rule 56.112 
Summary judgment has played a major role in federal civil litiga-
tion.113  For plaintiffs, summary judgment is the place of “do or die.”  
Summary judgment lurks over pleading, Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss, Rule 11, discovery, and mediation or dispute resolution if the 
case is diverted to a “neutral third party,”114 for the question is always 
what will happen on summary judgment.  It impacts and intertwines 
with every aspect of litigation—alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
 
American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 38-39 (proposing areas for future inves-
tigation of the “vanishing trial” trend).  Ironically, this project led to the development 
of the new ABA Principles Relating to Juries and Jury Trials.  See Terry Carter, The Ver-
dict on Juries, 91 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (describing the recommendations).  Legal commenta-
tors have recently taken note of these developments.  See Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flow-
ing In, but the Jury Pool Is Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A14 (noting a significant 
decrease in the proportion of cases going to trial). 
112 As of December 1, 2009, the recently amended Rule 56 reads as follows:  
(a) By a Claiming Party.  A party claiming relief may move, with or without 
supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim. 
(b) By a Defending Party.  A party against whom relief is sought may move, 
with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of 
the claim. 
(c) Time for a Motion, Response, and Reply; Proceedings. 
(1) These times apply unless a different time is set by local rule or the court 
orders otherwise: 
(A) a party may move for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after 
the close of all discovery; 
(B) a party opposing the motion must file a response within 21 days after the 
motion is served or a responsive pleading is due, whichever is later; and 
(C) the movant may file a reply within 14 days after the response is served. 
(2) The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no ge-
nuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56.  
113 See Burbank, supra note 107, at 594-603 (discussing the history of summary 
judgment).  For a general overview of summary judgment, see EDWARD J. BRUNET & 
MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:  FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2006).  
Judge Patrick Higginbotham has noted the change in the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts’s definition of “trial,” which now includes “any contested matter in which 
the judge takes evidence.”  Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial 
Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2002). 
114 See Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 43, at 46 (describing the value of 
mediation in employment actions). 
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pleading, discovery, and trial.  The threat of summary judgment 
shapes settlement even in advance of a motion being filed.  And when 
summary judgment is denied, lawyers and judges report that defen-
dants immediately offer to settle, often with far more generous settle-
ment offers than they might have otherwise considered.  A shift in 
power from plaintiffs to defendants is the result.115 
But as I suggested in the prior Section, the Supreme Court’s re-
cent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal now raise serious questions as to 
whether summary judgment will continue to play this central role in 
federal pretrial practice.  Since the ball has been moved forward to 
pleading, and a district court can simply grant a Rule 12(b)(6) dismis-
sal, summary judgment may become less central.  With Iqbal, the Court 
is ruling that there is no need for discovery, and the case ends at a very 
early stage—a stage that was not contemplated by the Federal Rules. 
Although Iqbal’s impact on pleading may be dramatic, it is impor-
tant to emphasize how controversial even granting dismissals on 
summary judgment—a much later stage in the litigation where there 
has already been discovery—has been in the federal courts.  In 1998, 
Judge Patricia Wald, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, expressed 
concern about the development and direction of summary judgment 
in the federal courts.116  She emphasized the importance of 
ensuring that summary judgment stays within its proper boundaries, ra-
ther than encouraging its unimpeded growth.  Its expansion across sub-
ject matter boundaries and its frequent conversion from a careful calcu-
lus of factual disputes (or the lack thereof) to something more like a 
gestalt verdict based on an early snapshot of the case have turned it into 
a potential juggernaut which, if not carefully monitored, could threaten 
the relatively small residue of civil trials that remain.
117
 
Other scholars have also been critical of the “new” summary 
judgment,118 and some have proposed reforms.119  Some recent scho-
 
115 See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 100-03 (1990) (examining how summary judgment affects 
the settlement process); see also Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
25 REV. LITIG. 79, 89-90 (2006) (arguing that the burden of production is systematical-
ly biased against plaintiffs).  
116 Wald, supra note 102, at 1917. 
117 Id. 
118 See generally Miller, supra note 108 (arguing that judges often place too much 
weight on judicial efficiency and not enough on litigants’ right to a jury trial). 
119 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 107, at 623 (“Unless the rules for determining 
when an issue of fact is triable are determinate and enforced, summary judgment as an 
equilibrating device is bound to get out of balance somewhere.”); Friedenthal & Gard-
ner, supra note 110, at 125-30 (proposing a cost-benefit analysis for the denial of sum-
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larship has proposed that summary judgment should be abolished on 
the ground that it is unconstitutional as a violation of the Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial, or simply on the ground that it is inef-
ficient.120  There are, of course, other views.121  But summary judgment 
may now play less of a role in federal pretrial practice because of Iqbal.  
While the Supreme Court’s recent procedure decisions underscore 
the Court’s enthusiasm for and endorsement of summary judgment,122 
pleading has now moved to the fore. 
The Civil Rules Committee’s work over several years on proposals 
to amend Rule 56 suggests the recent importance of summary judg-
ment in federal civil litigation.123  The amended Rule 56, which be-
came effective December 1, 2009, has made some significant changes 
in summary judgment practice.  While the impact of these changes on 
civil rights and employment discrimination cases may be more subtle 
than the “point-counterpoint” proposal—which the Advisory Commit-
tee rejected in part because of concern about how it would impact civ-
il rights or employment cases in light of opposition from scholars and 
 
mary judgment); Redish, supra note 110, at 1355-57 (rejecting the idea that absolute 
judicial discretion in granting summary judgment is needed). 
120 See Bronsteen, supra note 110, at 527-38 (reasoning that, without summary 
judgment, many disputes would settle earlier rather than going to trial, if those were 
the only two options); Miller, supra note 108, at 1110-14 (questioning the “efficiency” 
justification for summary judgment—though stopping short of calling for its abolition); 
Thomas, supra note 110, at 140-45 (arguing that summary judgment not only violates the 
Seventh Amendment, but also imposes substantial costs on the judicial system).  
121 District Judge Shira Scheindlin has approached summary judgment more sym-
pathetically and questioned the assumption that juries, not judges, should be evaluat-
ing sexual harassment cases.  See Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and 
Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 813, 852 (1999) (“For all their virtues, juries 
cannot contribute much to the effort to define sexual harassment better—by granting 
summary judgment in proper cases and carefully reviewing jury findings, however, 
judges can.”); see also Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Set-
tlement Problem:  Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2004) (pro-
posing a new mandatory summary judgment procedure at the beginning of a lawsuit to 
dispose of “nuisance-value” claims). 
122 In both Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court confirmed the importance of summary judg-
ment.  In Twombly, the Court suggested a heightened standard of pleading for Rule 
12(b)(6) motions that would result in dismissal of cases even earlier than summary 
judgment.  See supra Section I.A.  In Scott, the Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s denial of summary judgment in a § 1983 action involving a claim for damages 
against the police for a car chase.  550 U.S. at 386.  The Court watched a video of the 
chase and found that there was no need for a jury determination.  Id. at 379-81; see also 
infra Section I.B. 
123 See supra note 112 (reprinting the proposed amendment to Rule 56). 
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the plaintiff, civil rights, and employment bars—the new Rule will 
need to be closely watched.124 
Even with Iqbal, summary judgment deserves continuing attention 
and analysis as part of the larger picture of federal pretrial practice.  
Although, ironically, much of the Advisory Committee’s work over 
several years of drafting amendments to Rule 56 occurred before Iqbal 
was decided (and may have made summary judgment less central), 
there will still be cases not dismissed at pleading that will go on to dis-
covery and summary judgment.  Summary judgment is necessarily a 
very case-, fact-, and law-specific determination.  Summary judgment 
decisionmaking at the trial level and review of grants of summary 
judgment at the appellate level involve subtle assessments of the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case based on what may be a very abbre-
viated record of discovery.  Traditional application of summary judg-
ment meant that judges should not grant it if there were material is-
sues of fact in dispute, for issues of fact and credibility were to be 
assessed by the jury.  These days, however, federal judges—spurred on 
by the Supreme Court, pressure to clear dockets, and perhaps even 
dislike of or discomfort with certain claims (whether employment dis-
crimination, sexual harassment, or Family Medical Leave Act cases)—
grant summary judgment regularly.  Summary judgment decisionmak-
ing necessarily involves a tremendous amount of discretion, and dis-
cretion can be the locus of hidden discrimination. 
Why is the grant of summary judgment a problem?  The first rea-
son is that it ends the case for the plaintiff:  the plaintiff does not have 
the opportunity for a jury trial (in those cases where the plaintiff 
would otherwise have a right to a jury trial).125  Of course, not every 
plaintiff should have the right to a jury trial, for not every case is meri-
torious.  The purpose of summary judgment is to separate out “neces-
sary” trials from “unnecessary” trials; the issue in any case in which a 
motion for summary judgment is made is whether trial is “necessary.”  
In civil rights or employment discrimination cases, however, where 
subtle issues of credibility, inferences, and close legal questions may 
be involved, where issues concerning the “genuineness” or “materiali-
ty” of facts are frequently intertwined with law, a single district judge 
 
124 See infra Part II (discussing the amended Rule 56). 
125 Is there a difference between summary judgment and bench trial?  The fact-
finder is the same, but the nature of the proof, the evidence, and the procedural post-
ure are different.  See Guggenheim, supra note 110, at 320-24 (deducing that, since li-
mitations on summary judgment exist to protect a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial, those 
limitations do not apply to bench trials).  
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may be a less preferable decisionmaker than a jury.  Juries are likely to 
be far more diverse and to bring a broader range of perspectives to 
bear on the problem.126 
Even if we do not assume that a jury would reach a different con-
clusion than a judge on the facts of a particular case, the presentation 
of live evidence before a jury and the telling of the full story in a pub-
lic setting can make an important difference to a civil rights or em-
ployment discrimination plaintiff.  The plaintiff will have a “day in 
court,” and the facts of the case will be heard and arguably even au-
thenticated.  These issues of “process” can matter a great deal to 
plaintiffs.127  Public disclosure of legal issues also matters in important 
ways to the evolution of the law.  If plaintiffs’ experiences of harm—
which would otherwise be “invisible”—are heard more frequently in 
courts and public settings, judges may ultimately view them as consti-
tuting a legal claim.  Thus, disclosure can help plaintiffs’ claims take 
on legal “visibility.”  Even more importantly, federal jurisprudence 
 
126 In Gallagher v. Delaney, Judge Jack Weinstein observed that “[a] federal judge is 
not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor of American cultures in 
their many manifestations” and that “a jury made up of a cross-section of our hetero-
geneous communities” is the best arbiter of such issues.  139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 
1998).  Judge Weinstein further observed that “[w]hatever the early life of a federal 
judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American 
socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking the current real-life experience required 
in interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle per-
ceptions, and implicit communications.”  Id. 
 Current statistics on the diversity of the federal judiciary support this view.  Across 
all federal courts, there are 1285 sitting judges.  Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United 
States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/judges_frm (follow “The Federal 
Judges Biographical Database” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).  Of these judges, 
only 18% are female.  Id.  Looking at both male and female judges, 9% are African 
American, 5% are Hispanic, and less than 1% are either Asian American or Native 
American.  Id.  Of female judges, 12% are African American, 7% are Hispanic, and on-
ly one, accounting for less than 1% of female judges, is Asian American.  Id.  There are 
no Native American female judges.  Id.   
 Data seem to support the proposition that juries are more diverse and bring 
broader perspectives to bear.  In one study of several major cities, women comprised 
52.9% of federal court juries.  See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves:  The Pow-
er, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 325 n.3 (1995); see 
also JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiii-xv (2004) (arguing that groups 
of people are “remarkably intelligent” and that “[e]ven if most of the people within a 
group are not especially well-informed or rational, [the group] can still reach a collec-
tively wise decision . . . when [its members’] imperfect judgments are aggregated in the 
right way”). 
127 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Com-
pensation for Harm:  Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 355, 358-69 (2003) (arguing that the Victim Compensation Fund failed to address 
expectations of justice and moral accountability for harm). 
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should be developed on a live record, with law shaped by facts, not on 
pleadings or on summary judgment.128 
In a ruling on summary judgment, the judge writes a decision in 
which, if there are material facts in dispute, she often acts as factfind-
er, determining whether there is enough evidence to reach a jury.  
Judicial opinions on summary judgment are often so mechanistic that 
they become “sliced and diced,” a process that, as Stephen Burbank 
puts it, “sees less in the parts by subjecting the nonmovant’s ‘evidence’ 
to piece-by-piece analysis” instead of analyzing it contextually.129  The 
judge makes her own inferences from the record and then grants 
summary judgment if she concludes that no “rational trier of fact” 
could find for the nonmoving party based on the showing made in the 
motion and response130 or, to put it more directly, that no reasonable 
juror could find for the nonmovant or disagree with the judge.  The 
determination of whether a “reasonable juror” could find for the 
plaintiff is key.  On summary judgment, the judge is effectively sitting 
as a juror and deciding whether she could find for the plaintiff. 
What is now shocking is the degree to which the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Iqbal has made the analytic problems that have been so 
deeply troubling in summary judgment jurisprudence explicit at the 
pleading stage.  Many cases that have already been decided on the 
pleadings under Twombly and Iqbal replicate the very problems that 
scholars have identified concerning summary judgment.  On a plain-
tiff’s complaint and a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion (or answer), 
the court is deciding whether there is “enough” to go forward with the 
case—i.e., whether the plaintiff’s complaint and allegations are “plaus-
ible.”  However, in contrast with the analysis on summary judgment, 
 
128 See Wald, supra note 102, at 1942-43 (questioning whether a jurisprudence 
based largely on summary judgment motions can effectively account for the “multiva-
lenced and perspectival qualities of human events”). 
129 See Burbank, supra note 107, at 624-25 (calling this process factual and legal 
“carving”).  Michael Zimmer has also used the phrase “slicing and dicing”:  he de-
scribes “the common practice of courts in slicing and dicing the evidence supporting 
plaintiff’s case in order to grant motions for summary judgment and judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment 
Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 577 (2001).  In this Article, I use the phrase “slice and dice” to 
include both factual and legal carving.  Some have suggested that this occurs because 
law clerks are writing the opinions instead of judges.  Penelope Pether suggests that 
the de facto delegation of the vast majority of Article III judicial power to judicial 
clerks and staff attorneys has resulted in a disproportionate number of decisions 
against “have-nots.”  Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices:  How Judicial Clerks and 
Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 (2007).  
130 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
8 SCHNEIDER FINAL PRINT REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:30 PM 
2010] The Impact of Pretrial Practice on Discrimination Cases 545 
the complaint, Rule 12 motion, and answer provide an extremely 
sparse record on which the district court must make a decision.  At 
pleading, there has been no opportunity for discovery or for the fuller 
elaboration and argumentation that is presented in summary judg-
ment.  We are now seeing 12(b)(6) decisions in which the district 
court is simply “slicing and dicing” the factual and legal claims pre-
sented in the plaintiff’s complaint and making threshold and critical 
conclusions, which necessarily involve credibility determinations as to 
whether the plaintiff’s claims are “plausible” and whether the plain-
tiff’s case should go forward.  In a sense, it is almost as if all the prob-
lems that have previously been identified with summary judgment 
have been accelerated to the pleading stage.  With Iqbal, a summary 
judgment decision is effectively disguised as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
before any discovery occurs. 
Summary judgment has also been understood in the context of a 
“settlement,” not “trial,” culture.131  Among the most important con-
cerns of courts are docket pressures, and these same docket pressures 
may affect Iqbal decisionmaking.  Some district and circuit judges, 
such as Judge Posner, have expressed their concern regarding the use 
of summary judgment to alleviate “caseload pressures” and simply 
clear their civil calendar.132 Iqbal’s message to district judges is to use 
Rule 12(b)(6) instead to clear the civil calendar.  For many judges 
these pressures are undoubtedly contributing to 12(b)(6) grants on 
pleading, as well as to grants of summary judgment. 
 
131 See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 110, at 117 (noting that judicial partici-
pation in settlement conferences enhances judges’ ability to clear their dockets); see 
also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try:  Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1996) (observing that most litigants cannot afford 
to go to trial without a contingent-fee attorney or liability insurance).  There are also 
serious questions concerning the expense and cost-benefit ratio of making summary 
judgment motions.  See Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra note 29, at 17-20 (detailing 
the cost impact of summary judgment motions on settlement negotiations). 
132 Judge Posner’s opinion in Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394 (7th 
Cir. 1997), says this clearly:  
The expanding federal caseload has contributed to a drift in many areas of 
federal litigation toward substituting summary judgment for trial.  The drift is 
understandable, given caseload pressures that in combination with the Speedy 
Trial Act sometimes make it difficult to find time for civil trials in the busier fed-
eral districts.  But it must be resisted unless and until Rule 56 is modified . . . . 
Id. at 1397 (citations omitted); see also Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 
F.3d 169, 172 (7th Cir. 1996) (warning judges against using summary judgment to alle-
viate heavy caseloads).  But cf. Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 
517 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The timing of trials and docket control are matters best left to 
the discretion of the trial court.”). 
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How much proof is enough to deny summary judgment?  Most 
lawyers believe that the plaintiff has to convince the judge of the me-
rits of the case—perhaps even that the plaintiff would win the case—
to survive summary judgment and that the primary impact of the tri-
logy is that it focuses judges entirely on the sufficiency and weight of 
the plaintiff’s proof as developed in discovery.133  But on summary 
judgment, this proof is in the form of affidavits and depositions.  
While depositions are subject to cross-examination, affidavits are prob-
lematic because they are not.  This should mean that affidavits are not 
very useful or persuasive.134  “Snippets” of testimony from either party 
can be problematic because they are likely to be misleading.135  Ques-
tions of proof may inevitably involve issues of admissibility and judicial 
determination of the weight of the evidence.136  Of course, it depends 
on the discovery that was completed and the substantive-law require-
ments of the claims made.  This presents a fundamental conundrum 
of summary judgment:  issues of credibility are supposed to be de-
cided by the jury, but in order to decide if the proof is enough for a 
“reasonable juror,” the judge must implicitly decide issues of credibili-
 
133 But for a different view, see the comments of District Judge Laura Taylor Swain 
of the Southern District of New York, who suggests that in employment cases, plaintiffs 
“do not need to convince the court of the merits of the case, just that fact issues have 
been raised.”  Patrick F. Dorrian, Federal Judges Provide Insights on Summary Judgment Mo-
tions, 23 EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP. 516, 516 (2004) (paraphrasing Judge Laura Taylor 
Swain’s comments on pleading standards in employment disputes).  That may have 
been true in the “old” summary judgment framework but, in the “new” framework, 
judges may grant summary judgment unless they think that the plaintiff can win at trial. 
134 See id. at 516 (paraphrasing the comments of Judge John F. Keenan, who be-
lieves that affidavits are generally “not as likely to be [as] persuasive as a witness’s de-
position” because they are not subject to cross examination (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
135 Id.  If summary judgment requires such extensive discovery and is so fact inten-
sive, there is a serious question whether it is worthwhile for a judge to do this much on 
paper rather than to allow the case go forward to trial.  See Stephen N. Subrin & Tho-
mas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2000 (2004) (observing how summary judgment mo-
tions typically focus on only a few issues, thus failing to create an integrated narrative 
of law and fact).  This implicates old procedural disputes concerning the dichotomy 
between law and equity:  in law, there is a presumption in favor of oral testimony, while 
equity favors paper trials.  See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 992-
1000 (1987) (surveying the procedural differences between equity and common law). 
136 See, e.g., Rubens v. Mason, 387 F.3d 183, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing the 
lower court’s grant of summary judgment because the affidavit that was the basis for 
the district judge’s decision was inadmissible). 
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ty.137  With Iqbal, allegations in complaints are now effectively treated 
as proof. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Scott v. Harris provides a 
dramatic example of the summary judgment problem.138  Scott in-
volved a § 1983 action brought by a motorist against the police and 
other officials claiming use of excessive force during a high-speed 
chase, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.139  The district 
court denied a summary judgment motion by the defendant, and the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.140  In the Supreme Court, eight Justices re-
versed the denial of summary judgment and entered judgment for the 
defendant.141  The Justices watched a videotape of the chase and con-
cluded that “no reasonable jury” could find for the plaintiff.142  Only 
Justice Stevens, in a vigorous dissent, challenged this view.  He criti-
cized his colleagues for sitting as “jurors” rather than a reviewing court: 
 Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of a nighttime 
chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no pedestrians or oth-
er “bystanders” were present, buttressed by uninformed speculation 
about the possible consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the 
jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the views of the 
judges on both the District Court and the Court of Appeals who are sure-
ly more familiar with the hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we 
are.  The Court’s justification for this unprecedented departure from 
our well-settled standard of review of factual determinations made by a 
district court and affirmed by a court of appeals is based on its mistaken 
view that the Court of Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly 
contradicted by the record” and that respondent’s version of the events 
 
137 Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility de-
terminations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”).  In addition, in Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000), the Supreme Court empha-
sized the importance of jury determinations of credibility.  On the one hand, Reeves 
suggests that resolving credibility issues and drawing inferences from the evidence “is 
the job of the jury” and that courts must disregard such issues at summary judgment.  
See Dorrian, supra note 133, at 517 (reporting on the comments of attorney Patricia 
Breuninger).  On the other, Reeves “eliminated the assumption held by many that em-
ployment cases are uniquely appropriate for trial.”  Id. (quoting Gary D. Friedman).  In 
theory, the judge should not weigh credibility, must draw all reasonable inferences 
against the moving party, and should deny the motion if there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact.  But is this really possible when the judge has to weigh the evidence in order 
to decide whether the plaintiff has a chance of winning at trial?   
138 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
139 Id. at 375-76. 
140 Id. at 376. 
141 Id. at 386. 
142 Id. at 379-80. 
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was “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could 
have believed him.”
143
 
Justice Stevens refers to the Justices in the majority as “[m]y col-
leagues on the jury,”144 criticizing the Court for having “usurped the 
jury’s factfinding function and, in doing so, implicitly label[ing] the 
four other judges to review the case unreasonable.”145  Significantly, he 
notes that “[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about 
the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pur-
suit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree 
with this Court’s characterization of events.”146 
The impact of Scott v. Harris becomes even more important now in 
the context of Iqbal because of the limited record on which a judge 
decides whether to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  Now, judges must 
apply the “no reasonable jury” standard at pleading.  Much of the 
scholarly discussion concerning Scott has focused on the problem of 
“cultural cognition” and the degree to which the Supreme Court Justic-
es’ own normative values shaped the decision.147  In Iqbal, however, 
these cognitive factors are spelled out with greater specificity.  Judges 
are ordered to use their “judicial experience and common sense” to de-
termine if the plaintiff’s claims are plausible and the case should pro-
ceed. 
From empirical work on summary judgment and the “vanishing 
trial,” we have information on the actual practice of summary judg-
ment in federal district courts.  Longitudinal studies conducted by the 
Federal Judicial Center on summary judgment show a particularly 
high rate of termination by summary judgment in civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination cases.148  The most recent Federal Judicial 
 
143 Id. at 389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 392. 
145 Id. at 395. 
146 Id. at 396; see also Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose 
Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 837, 894-902 (2009) (discussing the importance of “judicial humility”). 
147 See Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging:  What Difference 
Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 421 (2009) (investigating the influence of cultural 
values on judicial decisionmaking and distinguishing between conscious bias—
“ideology”—and unconscious bias—“cultural cognition”).  But see Harry T. Edwards & 
Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors 
Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1959-63 (2009) (questioning Ka-
han’s distinction between ideology and cultural cognition). 
148 See Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19, at 17 tbl.12 (presenting summary 
judgment statistics disaggregated into various categories of actions:  contracts, torts, 
employment discrimination, other civil rights, and other). 
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Center Report prepared for the Advisory Committee concluded that 
“the prominent role of summary judgment in such cases is striking.  
Summary judgment motions by defendants are more common in such 
cases, are more likely to be granted, and more likely to terminate the 
litigation.”149  Recent data suggests that 70% of summary judgment 
motions in civil rights cases and 73% of summary judgment motions 
in employment discrimination cases are granted—the highest of any 
type of federal civil case.150 
Federal Judicial Center studies of summary judgment practice 
have determined that summary judgment is granted disproportionate-
ly to dismiss civil rights and employment cases.151  In the most recent 
study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, 77% of summary 
judgment motions in employment discrimination cases and 70% of 
summary judgment motions in other civil rights cases were granted, in 
whole or in part, as compared with 61% of summary judgment mo-
tions in torts cases, and 59% of summary judgment motions in con-
tracts cases.152  Further, 20% of employment discrimination cases and 
10% of other civil rights cases had at least one summary judgment mo-
tion granted, in whole or in part, as compared with 5% of tort and 6% 
of contracts cases.153  Additionally, 15% of employment discrimination 
cases and 6% of other civil rights cases were terminated by summary 
judgment, as compared with 3% of torts and 4% of contracts cases.154  
Another recent study of Federal Judicial Center database cases for fis-
cal year 2006 showed that an employment discrimination plaintiff 
faced an over 80% likelihood that a summary judgment motion would 
be granted in whole or in part.155 
 
149 Id. at 3 (citations omitted). 
150 Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Mi-
chael Baylson 6 tbl.3, 9 tbl.4 (Apr. 12, 2007, revised June 15, 2007) [hereinafter Cecil & 
Cort Memorandum], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy 
06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf.  In some judicial districts, grants of summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases were as high as 93%.  Id. at 9 tbl.4.  This confirms the 
anecdotal reports from federal race- and gender-bias task force reports that have sug-
gested that the application of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases 
is problematic.  See Wald, supra note 102, at 1938-39 (discussing several reports that 
suggest a judicial bias against employment discrimination cases).  
151 See Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3 (noting the “prominent 
role” of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases). 
152 Id. at 9 tbl.4.  
153 Id. at 16 tbl.11. 
154 Id. at 17 tbl.12. 
155 Seiner, supra note 17, at 1033 tbl.C. 
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It appears that there is wide variation in practice between differ-
ent district courts.156  Although summary judgment is transsubstantive 
like all federal procedural rules, scholars have reported the special use 
of summary judgment to dismiss sexual harassment and hostile work 
environment cases,157 race and national origin discrimination cases,158 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases,159 age-discrimination cas-
es,160 and prison-inmate cases.161 
In sum, summary judgment has historically been viewed as the ma-
jor procedural hurdle in federal civil litigation, but Iqbal has now 
changed the game and pleading has become more crucial.  The 
“double-whammy” of high pleading standards and defendant friendly 
summary judgment practices is a reason for plaintiffs to prefer state 
court to federal court.162  Thus, although the information available on 
 
156 See Burbank, supra note 107, at 591 (finding “evidence that the [summary 
judgment] termination and other activity rates vary, sometimes dramatically, among 
courts and case types”); see also Dorrian, supra note 133, at 516 (quoting Judge John F. 
Keenan of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, who 
cautions, “You have to be aware of your circuit and its local rules,” and contrasting 
Judge Keenan’s practice of holding pre-motion conferences in employment discrimi-
nation cases with that of Judge William J. Martini of the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, who does not hold pre-motion conferences and was “not 
aware of the practice in the District of New Jersey”).  
157 See Schneider, supra note 20, at 709-11 (citing evidence that summary judgment 
is granted more frequently in employment discrimination cases with female plaintiffs). 
158 See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing:  Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 889, 895 (2006) (arguing that, based on an empirical study of race, 
age, and gender cases, race-based employment cases are more likely to be dismissed at 
the summary judgment phase).  Parker’s study found that plaintiffs won summary 
judgment motions in race discrimination cases only 25% of the time.  Id. at 910 n.98. 
159 See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999) (arguing that courts may be abusing summary 
judgment in ADA cases); see also Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Un-
der the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor:  Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-
Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 363 (2000) 
(noting that “employees face a Catch-22 situation” when they are forced to demon-
strate severe disabilities that do not simultaneously prevent them from doing their 
jobs, a situation which often leads to a grant of summary judgment for the defendant). 
160 See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy:  The Improper Use 
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 232-33 (1993) (ar-
guing that courts’ refusal to evaluate the adequacy of employers’ alleged reasons for 
discharge “prejudices plaintiffs opposing summary judgment motions”). 
161 See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1594-95 (2003) 
(reporting that a great majority of inmate civil rights cases are resolved in favor of de-
fendants at the pretrial stage). 
162 See Gallagher, supra note 15 (attributing the decline in federal employment 
cases at least in part to plaintiffs’ preference for state courts); see also Mauro, supra note 
65 (discussing the possible causes for this exodus from federal court, including judicial 
bias and ADR). 
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plaintiff’s choice of forum and preference for state courts was ga-
thered before Iqbal was decided, summary judgment now plays a role 
in choice of forum in cases that could be filed in either state or feder-
al court.163  With the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, more tort cases 
that would otherwise be heard in state court will now be heard in fed-
eral court.164  Furthermore, new pleading rules and summary judg-
ment decisionmaking have made it far more difficult for civil rights 
and employment discrimination plaintiffs to get relief in federal court. 
C.  Daubert 
Although Daubert motions regarding expert testimony most often 
precede motions for summary judgment, I briefly discuss the former 
here in conjunction with summary judgment.  Daubert motions, typi-
cally presented in motions in limine, are usually initiated by defen-
dants to exclude expert testimony that would be proffered at trial by 
plaintiffs.165  They are another significant form of judicial gatekeeping 
that has developed over the last thirty years. 
There is significant interplay between summary judgment and 
Daubert determinations of expert evidence.  Daubert plays a critical role 
in summary judgment cases because if the judge determines that the 
plaintiff’s expert evidence is inadmissible, granting summary judg-
ment becomes significantly easier.  Daubert is now viewed as a “sum-
mary judgment substitute.”166  The “abuse of discretion” standard of 
review used in Daubert judgments is more limited than the more gen-
eral “de novo” standard used in summary judgment.  Thus, Daubert 
rulings may be the preferred method of district court resolution be-
 
163 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16 (presenting data 
gathered between 1970 and 2007). 
164 See JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”:  Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and 
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 745-50 (2004) (describing how CAFA has ex-
panded federal court jurisdiction over tort claims arising under state law). 
165 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme 
Court directed federal judges to act as “gatekeepers” in examining the method or rea-
soning underlying proposed expert evidence and to admit only evidence that is relia-
ble and relevant.  In this Article, I use “Daubert ” as shorthand for the trilogy of cases 
that developed the procedural rules for admissibility of expert testimony, the other 
cases forming the trilogy are Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
166 See Lind, supra note 164, at 771 (asserting that the Daubert hearing is the best 
example of “summary judgment substitutes” by which “a litigant’s potential to rely on 
expert testimony to stave off summary judgment can be foreclosed in advance”). 
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cause they provide greater discretion for district court judges and less 
chance of reversal on appeal.167 
There is no question that Daubert has both changed the way that 
federal district judges assess expert evidence in civil cases and in-
creased summary judgment.  A 2001 empirical study prepared for the 
RAND Corporation found that “[t]he rise that took place in both the 
proportion of evidence found unreliable and the proportion of chal-
lenged evidence excluded suggests that the standards for admitting 
evidence have tightened.”168  The authors of the RAND study, in a sec-
tion on the interplay between Daubert and summary judgment, con-
cluded that challenges to expert evidence increased summary judg-
ments and case dismissals.169  They noted that the frequency with 
which summary judgment was requested 
may be due partly to Daubert, but it may be driven by broader trends in 
litigation practices that have nothing to do with Daubert.  For example, 
 
167 See Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests:  The Impact 
of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 289, 324 (noting the more lenient standard of review 
that judges enjoy when granting Daubert motions).  The procedural interconnections 
and overlap between Daubert and summary judgment are troubling.  A 2006 petition 
for certiorari to the Supreme Court in an antitrust case presented the following ques-
tions:  first, “[w]hether lower courts err when they meld the standards for summary 
judgment under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 56 and the relevance and reliability requirements for 
admissibility under [FED. R. EVID.] 702”; and second, “[w]hether, in order to clarify the 
distinction between admissibility decisions and evidence sufficient to grant summary 
judgment, courts have an obligation to give reasons—which cannot include weighing 
testimony—why admissible expert evidence that reaches all material facts necessary to 
establish a claim for relief under applicable law is not sufficient to avoid summary 
judgment.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health 
Servs., 549 U.S. 1209 (2007) (No. 06-822).  For a discussion of the confusion between 
admissibility standards relevant to Daubert determinations and sufficiency standards 
involved in summary judgment that arise in Daubert/summary judgment decisionmak-
ing, see Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment:  Reconciling Ce-
lotex and Daubert After Kochert, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 307, 309-11 (2008), which discusses 
the “monumental problem” created when summary judgment determinations are 
made in the guise of admissibility decisions. 
168 LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAU-
BERT DECISION, at xiii (2001); see also id. at xv (“Our analysis of district court opinions 
suggests that after Daubert, [federal] judges scrutinized reliability more carefully and 
applied stricter standards in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.”); Carol Kraf-
ka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony 
in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 328-31 (2002) (reporting results 
from surveys of judges and attorneys that suggest greater scrutiny of scientific evidence 
in the wake of Daubert). 
169 See DIXON & GILL, supra note 168, at 56 (positing that “challenges to plaintiffs’ 
evidence have increasingly resulted in case dismissals”). 
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judges may have become more receptive to summary judgment requests 
in an attempt to resolve cases more quickly and at lower cost.  But Dau-
bert may have led challengers to expand the scope of their challenges to 
the point where they increasingly challenged the entire basis of the case 
and thus more frequently requested summary judgment.
170
 
Although Daubert was thought to primarily affect toxic tort cases,171 
it now impacts a wide range of cases.  Daubert has been applied to anti-
trust cases involving economic experts172 as well as to cases involving 
social science experts, including gender discrimination and gender 
stereotyping cases.173  In the tort context, however, “[t]he resulting ef-
fects of Daubert have been decidedly pro-defendant.”174  Indeed, “[i]n 
the civil context, Daubert has empowered defendants to exclude cer-
tain types of scientific evidence, substantially improving their chances 
of obtaining summary judgment and thereby avoiding what are per-
ceived to be unpredictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries.”175 
Some scholars have argued that Daubert has effectively changed 
the substantive law of torts.176  Others assert that Daubert’s elimination 
of jury deliberation for certain litigants has serious race and class conse-
quences.177  The interrelationship between Daubert and summary judg-
ment is a crucial dimension of current summary judgment practice.178 
 
170 Id. at 56-57. 
171 See Berger, supra note 167, at 290 (noting that Daubert’s effect on plaintiffs’ abil-
ity to prove causation drove some to assert that “toxic tort law is being reformulated in 
federal court to the advantage of defendants”). 
172 See Robert G. Badal & Edward J. Slizewski, Economic Testimony Under Fire, 56 
A.B.A. J. 56, 56 (noting that courts are excluding expert economic testimony as unreli-
able with “increasing frequency” in the wake of Daubert and Kumho). 
173 See Peter Nordberg, Daubert Decisions by Field of Expertise, http://daubert 
ontheweb.com/fields.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (listing pertinent federal cases orga-
nized by type of expert witness involved, including cases involving gender discrimination). 
174 See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter?  A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (2005). 
175 Id. 
176 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse:  How Trial Judges 
Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 335, 335 (1999) (arguing that federal trial judges have used Daubert to make 
“substantive legal rules on causation” in product-liability cases by raising the threshold 
of admissibility for scientific evidence, effectively requiring plaintiffs to meet a higher 
evidentiary standard to survive summary judgment). 
177 See Frank M. McClellan, Bendectin Revisited:  Is There a Right to a Jury Trial in an 
Age of Judicial Gatekeeping?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 261, 264, 279-80 (1998) (asserting that 
Daubert has made it “substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to win product liability 
cases” and that it has race and class implications). 
178 Although I briefly discuss Daubert issues here, a close study of Daubert in civil 
rights and employment discrimination cases is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Experts are now widely used in civil rights and employment cas-
es.179  An article written soon after Daubert was decided reported that, 
based on a Westlaw search, one in every eight federal cases citing to 
Daubert was a civil rights action.180  The author predicted that, because 
of the development of such new claims as disability discrimination and 
the need for economic proof, Daubert cases would be widespread.181  
Gender and race stereotyping is an issue at the heart of many cases, 
whether involving “maternal wall” or sexual harassment or race dis-
crimination, and there has been considerable scholarship and expert 
testimony on cognitive bias in many race and gender discrimination 
contexts.  Cognitive bias research examines the subtle, often uncons-
cious biases that affect behavior and decisionmaking.182  Expert testi-
mony on cognitive bias can address problems of race, sex, or age dis-
crimination in the workplace.183  For example, Joan Williams and 
Nancy Segal discuss the potential use of expert testimony on cognitive 
bias to defeat motions for summary judgment by shifting judicial infe-
rences in “maternal wall” cases.184  Theresa Beiner has proposed the 
 
179 For example, the use of expert testimony in women’s rights cases is not new.  
An early women’s rights case involving expert testimony was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
in which social psychologist Susan Fiske testified that sex stereotyping likely affects 
employment decisions such as partnership selection.  490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989); see 
also Harriet Antczak, Assisting the Trier of Fact:  The Relevance of Daubert to Gendered 
Expert Testimony in Civil Litigation (Feb. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (ar-
guing that expert testimony in gender cases is often denied on relevance grounds). 
180 Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1, 6 n.34 (1995). 
181 See id. at 6-7 (listing three possible causes for an increase in the number of 
plaintiffs who employ expert testimony:  the increasingly “technocratic” nature of our 
society, new claims recognized by case law and statute, and the increased value of em-
ployment discrimination cases). 
182 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 
(1995) (“[C]ognitive bias may well be both unintentional and unconscious . . . [and 
biases] operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness.”). 
183 This area of research has expanded to include “implicit bias” and its effects on 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bi-
as:  Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (introducing “implicit bias” 
and using analytical methods to prove its existence); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan 
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:  Implicit Bias and Disparate 
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1024 (2006) (describing and examining legal actors’ 
behavioral tendencies). 
184 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall:  Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 132 (2003) 
(“Evidence from empirical social psychology . . . can show that bias against mothers 
may not fit the model of a generalized dislike of women; instead, bias may reflect a 
more subtle set of stereotypical assumptions about who is competent and who is not.”). 
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admission of social science evidence in sexual harassment cases to 
deal with the gap between the judge and the jury.185  But, with Daubert, 
would this testimony even be admitted?186 
We know that Daubert decisions are a cause of the disappearance 
of jury trials and public adjudication in federal civil trials.187  We also 
suspect that Daubert has had a chilling effect on plaintiffs.188  But there 
have been no recent empirical studies on the impact of Daubert gener-
ally or on civil rights or employment discrimination cases specifically.  
There is less information on what is actually happening with Daubert in 
the pretrial context than on other aspects of pretrial procedure.189  
Since expert testimony is now widely used in civil rights and employ-
ment discrimination cases, there is good reason to believe that the le-
thal combination of Daubert and summary judgment has affected these 
cases as well. 
 
185 THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES:  USING SOCIAL 
SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 12-14 (2005).  
186 See Minna Kotkin, Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 613, 617 (2005) (reviewing 
BEINER, supra note 185) (questioning whether expert testimony in sexual harassment 
cases would be effective because it would “undoubtedly provoke a Daubert attack”).  
187 See Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 281, 298 (2007) (“Daubert certainly can be abused.  The opportunity to 
dismiss a case which should be heard by a jury is within every judge’s grasp.”). 
188 See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 121 (“Discourage-
ment . . . could explain the recent downturn in the number of [employment discrimi-
nation] cases.”).  The impact of Daubert on forum shopping is elusive because some 
states have accepted Daubert.  See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 174. 
189 Both Margaret Berger, Professor at Brooklyn Law School, and Joe Cecil, Senior 
Research Associate at the Federal Judicial Center, have studied the impact of Daubert in 
a number of different capacities.  Both say that conducting a reliable study of Daubert’s 
impact on these cases using the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’s data would 
be difficult for a variety of reasons.  There has been little scholarly discussion of the 
impact of Daubert in civil rights or discrimination contexts.  See John V. Jansonius & 
Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation:  The Role of Reliability in As-
sessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 318 (1998) (discussing Daubert’s impact in 
the employment-litigation context); Deborah Dyson, Comment, Expert Testimony and 
“Subtle Discrimination” in the Workplace:  Do We Now Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way 
the Wind Blows?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 37, 72 (2004) (analyzing the effect Daubert 
will have on assessing expert testimony in a racial discrimination case).  One study of 
district judges who have decided Daubert motions suggests that judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents are more likely to admit expert testimony than those appointed 
by Republican presidents.  See Jeremy Buchman, The Effects of Ideology on Federal Trial 
Judges’ Decisions to Admit Scientific Expert Testimony, 35 AM. POL. RES. 671, 680-81, 690 
n.11 (2007).  
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II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
Many important implications, although preliminary, can be drawn 
from the gathered data.  First, both pleading and summary judgment 
decisions appear to result in a high dismissal rate for civil rights and 
employment cases.  Now, with Iqbal, district judges are likely to dispose 
of civil rights and employment cases at pleading—the earliest possible 
stage.  What used to be done at summary judgment can be done at 
pleading, much earlier in the litigation process and without the need 
for discovery.  With summary judgment and Daubert, cases are dis-
missed as well, but later in the process, and usually after some discov-
ery.  These trends raise important questions as to whether meritorious 
cases are being dismissed in the federal courts.  These cases are cer-
tainly being decided on incomplete factual records.  There are also 
significant policy concerns with the fact that these cases are now effec-
tively being sent to state courts. 
Another implication is that the judicial decisionmaking involved 
in Rule 12(b)(6), Daubert, and summary judgment motions with re-
spect to civil rights and employment discrimination cases becomes 
private, not public, adjudication.  Although not all of these cases may 
raise important issues of public concern, many of them will raise inno-
vative or novel claims.  Yet if these cases are dismissed on pleading, 
Daubert, or summary judgment grounds, they are not likely to enter 
the public sphere, with the attendant legitimization of claims and pub-
lic knowledge of new harms, unless they were particularly newsworthy 
when filed.  And, of course, cases that are dismissed at the pleading 
and summary judgment stages are being decided by district judges, 
not juries. 
Judicial decisionmaking in all these phases is shockingly consis-
tent, regardless of procedural context.  Pleading rules, Daubert deci-
sions, and summary judgment rules are all discrete and purportedly 
“neutral,” yet it appears that these “neutral” procedures are being in-
terpreted by many courts in the same way.  The consistency of judicial 
interpretation in these various procedural contexts, at least at plead-
ing and summary judgment, suggests the need for careful analysis of 
federal procedural revision.  Every new rule, aspect of a rule, or pro-
cedural development, always claimed to be “neutral,” can create an 
opportunity for judges to dismiss these cases and interpret the rules in 
such a way as to have a “disparate impact.”  Thus, every new rule—or 
procedural dimension of a new rule, like the proposed Rule 56 “point-
counterpoint” amendment—must be carefully scrutinized, even if it 
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looks “neutral” on its face, because it provides an additional opportu-
nity for differential treatment. 
This is a significant point which goes back to some of the most 
important themes in procedure—the fundamental interrelationship 
between substance and procedure.  We cannot just assume that pro-
cedural developments are neutral and ignore the substantive impact, 
particularly on a whole body of law.  Substantive decisions can be “dis-
guised as process” and process decisions can operate as a proxy for 
substantive impacts.190 
An example of the need for close analysis of “neutral” Rules was 
the proposed “point-counterpoint” amendment to Rule 56 that had 
been enthusiastically advanced by the Civil Rules Committee.  As men-
tioned earlier, revision of summary judgment in general became a ma-
jor priority for the Advisory Committee over several years.  The Civil 
Rules Committee had said that the Rule 56 revisions were proposed in 
order to change procedural aspects governing submission of a sum-
mary judgment motion and not to change the legal standard for sum-
mary judgment.191  Although the Advisory Committee ultimately re-
jected the “point-counterpoint” amendment, a revised Rule 56 was 
recently enacted.192 
The most significant revision was the Committee’s proposal of a 
“point-counterpoint” procedure for all district courts.  In “point-
counterpoint”, the movant submits its summary judgment motion and 
identifies those issues of material fact that are not in dispute, the 
nonmovant responds in kind, and the process ends with the movant’s 
response.  Some jurisdictions have, or have had, local rules that re-
quired this.  The Advisory Committee amendment sought to make 
this “point-counterpoint” process a presumptively uniform procedure 
for summary judgment motions in most cases. 
The Committee’s Request for Comment described the proposed 
Rule 56 “point-counterpoint” amendment in the following way: 
Rule 56 is revised to improve the procedures for presenting and decid-
ing summary judgment motions and to make the procedures more con-
sistent with those already used in many courts.  The changes are proce-
 
190 See Martinez, supra note 21, at 1017 (describing how ostensibly procedural rul-
ings in the “war on terror” cases have had profound substantive impacts). 
191 The movant must show that there is no “genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
192 The Advisory Committee appointed a subcommittee on Rule 56 that held a 
meeting with lawyers and a Mini-Conference.  The Committee then subjected the pro-
posed Rule to public comment and three public hearings around the country. 
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dural only and do not affect the standard for granting summary judg-
ment.  The proposed rule requires that unless the court orders a dif-
ent procedure in a case, a party moving for summary judgment must 
submit a statement of facts that it asserts are not in genuine dispute and 
entitle it to summary judgment.  The statement must list the asserted 
undisputed material facts in separate, numbered paragraphs, with cita-
tions to the record.  The party opposing the motion must file a response 
to the statement that addresses each fact by accepting, disputing, or ac-
cepting it in part and disputing it in part, either generally or for purpos-
es of the motion only.  The statement and response are separate from 
the briefs.
193
 
During its revisions of Rule 56, the subcommittee in charge of 
Rule 56 held two meetings, the second of which was a miniconference 
held in November 2007.  Several participants—individuals, represent-
atives of organizations, and federal judges—expressed considerable 
concern about the way in which this proposed “point-counterpoint” 
format could operate, and argued that it would have a serious impact 
on civil rights and employment discrimination cases.  There was good 
reason to be concerned about whether this new “point-counterpoint” 
format would simply exacerbate the “slice and dice” tendencies cur-
rently present in summary judgment decisionmaking.194  As discussed 
above, scholars and judges have highlighted the “slice and dice” ten-
dencies of federal judicial decisionmaking on summary judgment, 
particularly with respect to civil rights and employment discrimination 
claims.195  In addition, some participants emphasized the risk of added 
expense and litigation costs, particularly for plaintiffs and their law-
yers.  Nonetheless, this provision was kept in the proposed rule when 
it was subjected to comment and hearings. 
Comments regarding the proposed amendments were submitted 
between September 2008 and March 2009 and were posted online.  
Three hearings were also held during this time, and the comments 
 
193 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  A SUMMARY FOR 
BENCH AND BAR (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/Brochure.pdf [he-
reinafter SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].  
194 Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19 (studying what the proposed 
amendment’s effect, if any, would be on summary judgment practice in federal courts). 
195 These are cases in which judges often have to consider whether there are ge-
nuine issues of material fact in a holistic way and consider disparate aspects of evi-
dence and discovery together in the context of legal claims.  Yet, consistently in these 
cases judges fail to do this.  For a discussion of how summary judgment opinions “slice 
and dice” in a way that eliminates contextual analysis, see Burbank, supra note 107, at 
624-25, and Schneider, supra note 20, at 721-25. 
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were fascinating.196  The Chief Judge of the District of Alaska, John 
Sedwick, who had judicial experience both in Arizona (a jurisdiction 
with local rules similar to the proposed “point-counterpoint” format 
amendments) and Alaska (a jurisdiction without similar rules) wrote 
in opposition to the proposed “point-counterpoint” format.  He stated 
that his experience “indicate[d] that the requirement to submit leng-
thy enumerated statements of fact supported by citations to the record 
wastes the time of counsel and the court without providing any per-
ceptible benefit.”197  He detailed the enormous amount of time spent 
on summary judgment motions in Arizona as opposed to Alaska and 
argued that the proposed rule “will likely shift more responsibility for 
civil litigation from district judges to magistrate judges.”198  Several of 
his colleagues on the bench with similar dual-jurisdiction experience, 
along with several other district judges experienced with “point-
counterpoint” local rules, wrote letters to the Committee in concur-
rence.199 
Many comments were submitted by individual civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination lawyers, as well as plaintiffs’ employment law 
firms and civil rights impact organizations.200  One comment from a 
partner in a plaintiffs’ employment discrimination firm emphasized 
how these proposed rules would deleteriously affect his firm’s practice 
and the practices of other small firms that represent employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs.201  He detailed his experience with local “point-
 
196 The hearings were held in Washington, D.C., in November 2008; San Antonio, 
Texas, in January 2009; and San Francisco, California, in February 2009.  SUMMARY OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 193. 
197 Letter from Hon. John W. Sedwick, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. 
of Alaska, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Ad-
min. Office of the U.S. Courts (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/20 
08Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-017-Comment-Sedwick.pdf. 
198 Id.   
199 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2008 Civil Rules Comments Chart, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008_Civil_Rules_Comments_Chart.htm (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2009). 
200 See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Wiley, Rob Wiley, P.C., to Peter G. McCabe, 
Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1 
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008 Comments Committee Fold-
ers/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-179-Comment-Wiley.pdf (highlighting an employment 
law specialist’s opposition to the proposed changes because of their ineffectiveness 
with indirect evidence). 
201 Letter from Joseph D. Garrison, Garrison, Levin-Epstein, Chimes, Richardson 
& Fitzgerald, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1-2 (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/200 
8 Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-016-comment-garrison.pdf. 
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counterpoint” rules that were particularly resource intensive, and he 
argued that the proposed rule would make the playing field even 
more uneven between plaintiffs and defendants in employment cases 
in federal courts.202  Other comments emphasized the narrative struc-
ture of civil rights and employment cases and argued that “point-
counterpoint” responses would not work well with “the complex narr-
atives typical to [such] cases,” encouraging lawyers to get caught up in 
minutiae and overwhelming technicalities.203 
A particularly critical set of comments emerged from federal 
judges who had worked with “point-counterpoint” local rules but de-
cided to stop using them because they found them onerous.  Judge 
Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California wrote an especially influential memorandum on behalf of 
all district and magistrate judges in the Northern District agreeing 
with many of the concerns that others had expressed and explaining 
that judges in her district had found the proposed rules problematic 
and ultimately decided to do away with them.204 
As the Advisory Committee was developing its proposals, it asked 
the Federal Judicial Center to examine summary judgment practice 
across federal district courts as a means of assessing the potential im-
pact of the proposed amendments to Rule 56.  The Federal Judicial 
Center Report compared summary judgment practice across districts 
with three different types of local rules as well as types of cases includ-
ing both employment discrimination and other civil rights cases.205  
The Report noted that 
 
202 Id.  A listing of all comments on the then-proposed changes to Rule 56 is avail-
able on the website of the U.S. Courts.  See 2008 Civil Rules Comments Chart, supra note 
199.   
203 Letter from Stefano G. Moscato, Program Dir., Nat’l Employment Lawyers 
Ass’n, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts 3 ( Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008 
Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-143-Testimony-Moscato.pdf; 
see also Letter from John Vail, Constitutional Litig. Ctr., to Hons. Mark R. Kravitz and 
Michael Baylson (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008%20Comments 
%20Committee%20Folders/CV%20Comments%202008/08-CV-046-Testimony-
Center%20For%20Constitutional%20Litigation%20%28Vail%29.pdf. 
204 See Letter from Hon. Claudia Wilken, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., to 
Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure & 
Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Procedure 1-2 (Dec. 11, 
2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008 Comments Committee Folders/CV Com-
ments 2008/08-CV-090-Comment-Wilken.pdf (“A complex narrative cannot be effectively 
told in a list of undisputed facts.”).  
205 Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3. 
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[w]hile we found few differences across the three [different types of lo-
cal rules] in employment discrimination cases, the prominent role of 
summary judgment in such cases is striking.  Summary judgment mo-
tions by defendants are more common in such cases, are more likely to 
be granted, and more likely to terminate the litigation.  This is true with-
out regard to the nature of the local rules regarding summary judgment.
206
 
This strong conclusion does not fully capture the tremendous dispari-
ties among types of cases that the data on summary judgment showed, 
including a 15% termination rate by summary judgment in employ-
ment discrimination cases, as opposed to a 3% rate in tort cases.207 
The intense comment and hearing period on the Rule 56 revi-
sions focused primarily on the “point-counterpoint” proposal.  One 
could fairly ask the question, if employment cases are already “ham-
mered” by summary judgment, why would the “point-counterpoint” 
format make any difference?208  My argument, shared by many other 
civil rights and employment discrimination lawyers who submitted 
comments or presented testimony at the hearings, was based on a 
combination of factors, including the disparate impact that the “point-
counterpoint” provision would have on the narrative dimensions of 
civil rights and employment discrimination cases, and the likelihood 
that it would exacerbate the judicial tendency to “slice and dice” issues 
in summary judgment decisionmaking, which is even more problemat-
ic in these cases.  In addition, the “point-counterpoint” format in-
creases expense and presents a burden for plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Finally, 
there seemed to be no real reason that judges needed the format to 
help them decide summary judgment motions.  All of these factors 
weighed against the “point-counterpoint” proposal, and the Commit-
tee ultimately rejected it.209 
 
206 Id. at 3 (citations omitted). 
207 Id. at 17 tbl.12. 
208 This question was presented to me by Joe Cecil.  My written submission to the 
Committee and my testimony at the Washington, D.C., hearing in November 2008 at-
tempted to answer this question.  See Letter from Elizabeth Schneider, supra note 23.  
In addition to the “point-counterpoint” provision of the proposed amendments, and in 
light of my argument about “neutral” rules, there are other provisions of the amended 
Rule 56 not discussed here that I believe require close scrutiny because they could af-
fect civil rights and employment cases. 
209 The Committee recognized that this amendment was controversial and had 
“provoked a near avalanche of comments.”  Kravitz Memorandum, supra note 24, app. 
at C-7.  It concluded that “the time has not come to mandate it as a presumptively uni-
form procedure for most cases.  The comments and testimony showed the perils of mi-
suse and suggested that there is less desire for national uniformity than might have 
been expected.”  Id. at 7. 
8 SCHNEIDER FINAL PRINT REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:30 PM 
562 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 517 
While this was a good result, the summary judgment amendments 
emerged from a civil rulemaking process that has been fairly criti-
cized, both for not being sufficiently attentive to issues of access to 
court as well as for arising from committees that are not broadly rep-
resentative of the legal profession.210  Relatively few plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have been members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules com-
pared with the number of defense lawyers.  Lawyers who are ap-
pointed to the Committee are usually partners in large law firms who 
mostly represent defendants, not full-time public service lawyers.  Un-
surprisingly, in the wake of the Bush administration and the Rehn-
quist/Roberts Court, Republican-appointed federal judges outnumber 
Democrat-appointed judges on the Committee.  It is not yet clear 
whether the composition of either the Advisory Committee or the 
Standing Committee will change significantly during the Obama ad-
ministration, given that Chief Justice Roberts makes the appoint-
ments.211  One certainly hopes that it will.  In the meantime, these 
amendments will affect employment discrimination, civil rights cases, 
and plaintiffs’ lawyers.  In light of the picture presented here, this is 
troubling. 
III.  WHY IS THIS HAPPENING? 
Many factors may have given rise to these developments in federal 
pretrial practice.  It is often difficult to understand developments in 
federal civil litigation reform, to identify their various influences, and 
to evaluate their impact.  There are rarely simple cause-and-effect re-
lationships.  I have used the phrase “disparate impact” advisedly to de-
scribe the effect that these procedural changes appear to have on civil 
rights and employment discrimination cases.  The phrase is associated 
 
210 See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access:  Rethinking the Structure of Federal 
Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 45-49), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266315 (proposing that the rulemaking process be re-
structured to enhance access by modifying the composition of the Civil Rules Commit-
tee); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:  Errors of Scope, 
52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613-18 (2001) (arguing that rulemaking committees are dispro-
portionately composed of practitioners from large law firms that represent corporate 
defendants). 
211 For the present composition of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, see U.S. Courts, Current Membership 
with Terms, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Committee_Membership_Lists/ST_Roster 
_2009.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).  The Chief Justice makes the Committee ap-
pointments.  See U.S. Courts, Committees of the Judicial Conference, http://www.us 
courts.gov/judconf_committees.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (“The Chief Justice 
has sole authority to make Committee appointments.”).  
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with the problem of neutral rules that are applied unequally in  
employment discrimination law.  Here, all we know are  
the output results, not why they occurred.  In this Part, I explore  
potential causes. 
The first is the change in the composition of the federal judiciary 
over time.  To the extent that political affiliation of the appointing 
president is a good proxy for political ideology,212 data suggest that a 
majority of sitting federal judges are ideologically conservative.213  
Both because of political affiliation and age, many current federal 
judges do not have a strong sense of the federal courts’ history as pro-
tectors of civil rights and civil liberties, nor of the role they played in 
the American civil rights movement.  Indeed, a recent empirical study 
of the relationship between the political party of the president who 
appointed a federal district court judge and outcomes in employment 
discrimination cases found a statistically significant difference between 
a plaintiff’s chance of success on a summary judgment motion before 
a judge appointed by President Clinton and a judge appointed by 
President George W. Bush.214  President Obama’s election could, 
therefore, have an important effect on federal civil litigation employ-
ment discrimination and civil rights cases.  One recent commentator 
analyzed the impact President Obama’s judicial nominations could 
 
212 See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on 
Federal Courts of Appeals:  A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 314-15 (2004) 
(presenting data showing that a judge’s ideological tendency in several areas of law can 
be predicted by the party of the appointing president). 
213 As of July 16, 2008, 362 of 660 federal district court judges were appointed by 
Republican presidents, while 298 judges were appointed by Democratic presidents.  
Daniel De Groot, Fourth Circuit Majority Auditions for JP Stevens’ Job, OPEN LEFT, July 16, 
2008, http://openleft.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=6966.  Republican-appointed judges 
made up a majority of district court judges in eight of the twelve circuits (including the 
D.C. Circuit).  Id.  At the circuit court level, ninety-nine judges were Republican ap-
pointees, while sixty-seven were Democratic appointees.  Id.  Ten of the thirteen cir-
cuits had mostly Republican-appointed judges, two had a majority of Democratic 
judges, and one was split evenly.  Id.  On the Supreme Court, seven justices were Re-
publican appointees and two were Democratic appointees (although this split has 
shifted to six Republican appointees and three Democratic appointees with Justice 
Souter’s resignation and Justice Sotomayor’s appointment).  Id.  
214 See John Friedl & Andre Honoree, Is Justice Blind?  Examining the Relationship 
Between Presidential Appointments of Judges and Outcomes in Employment Discrimination Cas-
es, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 89, 96-97 (2007) (showing that plaintiffs had a 38.7% chance of 
surviving a summary judgment motion before a Clinton appointee, compared to a 
27.8% chance before a Bush II appointee).  However, this is a controversial issue.  See 
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 147, at 1905-07 (arguing that empirical studies do 
not meaningfully reflect the effect of ideology on appellate decisionmaking). 
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have on the composition of the federal judiciary.215  The possibilities 
for change are significant.216 
The limited view of federal courts’ historical importance in civil 
rights matters that many district judges now hold is ironic, given the 
crucial federal subject matter jurisdiction case law that emphasizes the 
federal judiciary’s unique role, characterizes the federal courts as a 
precious resource, and often seeks to restrict diversity jurisdiction be-
cause it effectively requires federal judges to act as state judges, rather 
than fulfilling their unique federal duties.  Although my focus here is 
pretrial practice, the recent Clermont and Schwab study shows that 
jury trials result in considerably more favorable verdicts for civil rights 
plaintiffs than bench trials.217  This seems to suggest that judges are 
getting rid of civil rights cases, whether through their pretrial deci-
sions on the pleadings, summary judgment rulings, or bench trials. 
Second, many federal judges appointed over the last few years ap-
pear to be deeply skeptical of civil rights and employment cases.  They 
do not identify with employment discrimination or civil rights plain-
tiffs—whether because of race, gender, disability, age difference, or a 
lack of sensitivity to problems in the workplace.218  Many judges appar-
ently tend to view these cases as petty, involving whining plaintiffs 
complaining about legitimate employment or institutional matters, ra-
ther than important civil rights issues.  Although these views have the 
greatest impact on plaintiffs when held by district judges, circuit 
judges’ anti-plaintiff attitudes also affect the outcome of cases.219 
I have had numerous conversations with federal judges who have 
said that they believe many employment discrimination cases in feder-
al court are weak and that lawyer case “selection bias” is a cause.  But 
 
215 Eric R. Haren, Commentary:  The Real Battle for the Federal Judiciary, LAW.COM,  
July 31, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432541517&thepage=1.  
216  Since Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation, a number of new district and circuit 
judges have been nominated.  See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, PACE OF PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 
JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 1-2 (2009), http://www.afj.org/check-the-facts/nominees/ 
nomspacefactsheet91509.pdf (reporting that, as of September 15, 2009, President Ob-
ama had nominated a total of eight circuit judges and nine district judges).  The pace 
of these judicial nominations has become a subject of concern.  Charlie Savage, Obama 
Backers Fear Opportunities to Reshape Judiciary Are Slipping Away, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2009, at A20. 
217 Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 130-31. 
218 See Selmi, supra note 14, at 561-69 (arguing that judges’ personal perspectives 
subconsciously affect their decisionmaking). 
219 See Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 212, at 318-21 (showing that affir-
mative action, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and disability claims reveal evi-
dence of ideological voting). 
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there is no real empirical support for this proposition.220  In fact, a re-
cent study of settlement rates concludes that employment discrimina-
tion cases settle less frequently than other types of cases, suggesting 
that “[i]t is unlikely that employment attorneys fail to substantially 
screen their cases on the merits.”221  The study cites a report that 
“plaintiffs’ counsel accept only 5 percent of the employment discrimi-
nation claims brought to them by prospective clients, a case accep-
tance rate lower than that reported for plaintiffs’ tort attorneys.”222  
The authors also conclude that “the weight of evidence suggests that 
civil rights victims may be less likely to litigate than other victims, leav-
ing little evidence that their claims are on average objectively weaker, 
and that the cases’ poor quality explains lower settlement rates.”223 
Perhaps judges simply have a more punitive reaction to cases they 
perceive as weaker, or perhaps just to civil rights and employment dis-
crimination cases.  A burgeoning literature on cognitive bias helps to 
explain how many judges see these cases, focusing on the problems of 
gender, race, and class bias, as well as a lack of judicial humility and 
capacity to see issues outside their own perspective.224  Newly ap-
pointed Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings highlight 
the importance of these issues.225  And since Iqbal has now made the 
 
220 See Selmi, supra note 14, at 570-71 (noting that most employment discrimina-
tion attorneys are motivated by the profit potential of their cases, and so are unlikely to 
litigate frivolous claims).  
221 Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 42, at 143-44. 
222 Id. at 143-44; see also Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 
114 n.34 (“Contingent-fee attorneys, as well as those looking to fee-shifting, are surely 
reluctant to bring questionable claims.”). 
223 Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 42, at 145. 
224 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 146, at 896-906 (recommending 
that judges exercise judicial humility by recognizing that others may view fact patterns 
differently).  The concept of “judicial humility” is important and requires further dis-
cussion.  See Kahan, supra note 147, at 417-22 (discussing cultural cognition—the ten-
dency of individuals to evaluate risks and benefits differently depending on their past 
experiences); Schneider, supra note 20, at 766-71 (highlighting the problem presented 
by narrow judicial perspectives in cases involving gender); Stephen B. Burbank, On the 
Study of Judicial Behaviors:  Of Law, Politics, Science and Humility 19-20 (Univ. of Pa. Pub. 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-11, 2009), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393362 (noting that, in some courts and in some 
types of cases, judges’ personal characteristics influence their decisionmaking).  
225 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First 
Latina Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court:  The “High-Tech Lynching” of a “Wise Latina?” 20-
30, 39-43 (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 188, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460932 (outlining the ways in which a 
Latina justice may bring a new perspective to the Supreme Court’s analysis of cases and 
criticizing some Senators’ focus on her “wise Latina” comment).  
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application of “judicial experience” and “common sense” grounds for 
district courts’ evaluation of the “plausibility” of the allegations in 
plaintiffs’ complaints, the door is even more open to judicial bias.226 
A third reason for employment discrimination and civil rights 
plaintiffs’ lack of success in federal court may be the increasing and 
heavy emphasis on efficiency and docket control.  District judges often 
report that because of the schedule pressures of the criminal docket, 
they want to move cases off the civil docket quickly.  Twombly and Iqbal 
thus provide a way to get rid of civil cases as quickly as possible.  Given 
the vulnerability of civil rights and employment discrimination cases, 
judges are likely to exercise this option more readily than in other 
types of cases. 
A fourth factor is the growth of antijury attitudes in many types of 
civil cases.  In many federal civil cases, such as medical-malpractice ac-
tions, there is a move to take cases away from juries.227  Daubert certain-
ly encourages this result,228 as does summary judgment.  Twombly and 
Iqbal emerge from a similar anti-jury impulse.  Several years ago, I par-
ticipated on a panel at the Third Circuit Judicial Conference, entitled 
The New Fact-Finder:  Jury to Judge, that discussed these developments in 
federal pretrial practice.  Some of the federal judges on the panel dis-
cussed the importance of judicial factfinding and the way in which 
Daubert and summary judgment encouraged it.  Now that Twombly and 
Iqbal encourage dismissal at the pleading stage, these antijury attitudes 
are likely to be reflected in judicial decisions with respect to pleading 
as well. 
Fifth, it is important to acknowledge the deeply contested struggle 
between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers over the nature of Ameri-
can federal civil litigation.  Iqbal has raised the stakes in this struggle.  
It is significant that the costs of discovery were identified as reasons for 
the higher pleading burden in Twombly and Iqbal.  A joint project of 
the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and 
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System re-
cently issued a report that proposes radical revision of the federal civil 
 
226 See Mauro, supra note 65, at 1 (noting that Iqbal invites judges to “us[e] subjec-
tive factors” to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaints). 
227 See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (2007) 
(noting that pending legislation in Congress would transfer medical-malpractice cases 
from juries to administrative health courts). 
228 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1121, 1125-26 (2001) (arguing that Daubert stressed the judicial gatekeeping role). 
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litigation system, including severely limiting discovery,229 although the 
new report on discovery from the Federal Judicial Center suggests that 
discovery abuse is not the serious problem that the Court claimed it to 
be.230  The Standing Committee is sponsoring a conference in May 
2010 that will consider some of these issues.  But the entire system of 
federal civil litigation is under attack.  Pleading is the first round of 
this battle, but, for some participants, the goal is the end of (or at least 
severe limitations on) discovery.  The war is about the future of feder-
al civil litigation and access to justice in the federal courts. 
Sixth, perhaps the picture presented here is incomplete and the 
situation is really more complicated—perhaps more cases are going to 
arbitration and mediation, as some defense lawyers suggested in re-
sponse to the most recent Clermont and Schwab findings.231  Other 
“managerial” developments in the federal courts, such as settlement, 
summary jury trials, and the use of “neutrals,” may also have a dispa-
rate effect on civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs.  It 
is difficult to analyze the impact of all of these issues, and they un-
doubtedly play out differently in different federal courts.  However, 
they are vital to understanding the broader picture. 
Finally, my discussion raises two important questions:  First, why is 
it a problem if more civil rights and employment cases are filed in 
state court?  Assumptions about the primacy and superiority of federal 
courts as a forum for these cases might be historically specific and ro-
manticize many federal judges’ role in the civil rights movement.  Giv-
en ideological changes in the federal judiciary, some have argued that 
that is the case.  The traditional rationales for federal court disposi-
 
229 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 4-24 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/Content/ 
NavigationMenu/Publications/AllPublications/default.htm (follow “ACTL-IAALS Off-
icial Final Report” hyperlink).  
230 In a survey of attorneys in recently closed civil cases, which the Federal Judicial 
Center conducted in May and June of 2009, more than 60% of respondents (and two 
out of three defendant’s attorneys) reported that the disclosure and discovery in the 
closed cases generated the “right amount” of information.  More than half reported 
that the costs of discovery were the “right amount” in proportion to their clients’ stake 
in the closed cases.  The median estimate of the percentage of litigation costs incurred 
in discovery was 20% for plaintiffs and 27% for defendants.  EMERY G. LEE III & THO-
MAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY:  PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
231 See Gallagher, supra note 15. 
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tion are that life tenure protects judicial independence and that state 
court judges are exposed to more political pressure, particularly if 
matters in dispute involve state agencies or other branches of state 
government.  Are these assumptions still true?  Are they even more sa-
lient today, given the huge amount of campaign money and lobbying 
involved in state judicial elections?232  The Supreme Court’s recent de-
cision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,233 involving a West Virginia 
Supreme Court judge who received a massive campaign contribution 
relating to a matter pending before him but failed to recuse himself, is 
simply one example of corruption in state courts. 
The second question goes beyond the federal/state dichotomy 
presented here.  If more civil rights and employment discrimination 
cases end up in state court, will state courts begin to copy the federal 
procedural developments that I have described here in order to clear 
their dockets of these cases?  Will state court judges begin to exhibit 
the same bias against employment discrimination and civil rights cases 
that we have seen federal judges develop?  Many states model their 
procedural rules and decisions on the Federal Rules and federal pro-
cedure, so it is certainly possible.234  The data on state judges’ political 
affiliations is more elusive because each state has a different court sys-
tem with different subject matter jurisdictional requirements.  Moreo-
ver, as I have already suggested, the risks of political pressure are more 
considerable in state court.  This suggests that state courts might not 
permit civil rights and employment discrimination cases to be deter-
mined on the merits any more than federal courts appear to permit. 
 
232 See Editorial, The Best Judges Business Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at A18 
(reporting that thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges and arguing that 
“[t]he problem of wealthy interests’ trying to influence court decisions by pouring 
money into state judicial elections continues to escalate . . . . So does the threat to the 
impartiality, independence and integrity of the nation’s courts.”); see also Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that judges can announce 
their political beliefs during judicial election campaigns); Brendan H. Chandonnet, 
Note, The Increasing Politicization of the American Judiciary:  Republican Party of Minneso-
ta v. White and Its Effects on Future Judicial Selection in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 577, 582-83 (2004) (discussing the financing of state judicial campaigns). 
233 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
234 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (7th ed. 2008) (“[T]he Rules 
have had an influence far beyond the courts for which they were written.  Federal 
courts hear only 2 percent of civil cases in the United States.  But the model 
represented by the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]-—merger of law and equity, re-
laxed pleading, flexible joinder of claims and parties, and broad discovery—have deep-
ly influenced the procedure of state courts. . . . [E]very state now uses a procedural 
model that embraces most of these principles.  Thirty-five states have gone so far as to 
adopt the ‘federal’ Rules as their own procedural code.”). 
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IV.  CORRECTING THE IMPACT 
Understanding the impact of these seemingly interrelated dimen-
sions of the federal litigation process raises doubts about what “neu-
tral” means for rule and procedural change in the federal courts.  We 
cannot assume that procedural revision will not provide an additional 
excuse for dismissal, or application of a higher pleading burden, or 
summary judgment.  Clearly our aspirations for transsubstantive fed-
eral procedure are not being met.  Federal courts are getting rid of 
civil rights and employment discrimination cases and implicitly send-
ing a message that state courts are where these cases should be heard.  
The federal judiciary is transforming a major portion of its civil casel-
oad.  Although we can debate the pros and cons of federal and state 
courts as the protectors of rights, the shift is undeniably big. 
So what would make a difference?  First, proceduralists and rule-
makers need to pay close attention to the disparate impact of federal 
procedure on civil rights and employment cases.  Of course, it is hard 
to find solutions to these problems for the reasons that I discussed 
previously.  Second, the appointment of more federal judges whose 
life experiences and perspectives make them open to the kinds of cir-
cumstances that employment discrimination and civil rights cases 
present might also have an effect.  We need judges who are willing to 
consider and understand experiences outside of their often privileged 
circumstances.  We need judges who recognize the need for humility 
and who understand the limits of judicial factfinding.235  We need 
judges who have a sense of history and of the federal courts’ impor-
tance to “little people,” not just corporations.236  These issues, which 
emerged in sharp relief during Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s Supreme 
Court nomination and confirmation hearings, highlight the need for 
appointment of federal judges with diverse perspectives.237  Hopefully, 
the new federal judges that President Obama nominates will be con-
firmed and bring these broader perspectives to their judging. 
Federal judges should not be dismissing employment discrimina-
tion and civil rights cases so early in the pretrial process.  The devel-
opments in federal civil pretrial practice that I have described have 
 
235 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 146, at 896-906 (arguing that judges 
should not privilege their own factual perceptions). 
236 Thanks to Vicki Jackson for this point. 
237 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 225, at 39-43 (criticizing senators who spoke at Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing for focusing on the Justice’s “wise Latina” 
statement, because the statement merely suggests that she believes that “diversity of 
perspective among judges matters”).  
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not only harmed many civil rights and employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, but they have skewed the role of the federal courts and the 
development of federal jurisprudence.  There should be a presump-
tion that judges will allow cases to go forward and become fully devel-
oped on the basis of the facts.  This will ensure that judges make rea-
soned decisions about the merits of the cases.  We have to recognize 
the disparate impact of transsubstantive procedure on civil rights and 
discrimination claims.  The historic role of federal courts in the pro-
tection of civil rights and freedom from discrimination is at stake. 
 
